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REGULATING MARIJUANA ADVERTISING AND MARKETING TO
PROMOTE PUBLIC HEALTH: NAVIGATING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL MINEFIELD
by
Leslie Gielow Jacobs*
Marijuana legalization, at least to some extent, is now a reality in half
of the United States. This shift reflects on one hand the good reasons to
decriminalize marijuana use and to legalize and regularize its
cultivation, distribution, and retail sale. However, legalization also
introduces substantial public health dangers and injects the potent tool
of advertising and marketing to promote marijuana into the struggle for
persuasive influence between sellers aimed at increasing profits and
regulators trying to minimize the damages to public health. Limits on
advertising and marketing to reduce adverse public health consequences
are difficult to impose because of the increasingly aggressive
interpretations of the protections for advertising articulated by the
Supreme Court. Regulators must understand the types of regulations that
will provoke constitutional challenges, and how a court’s analysis of
each type of regulation will proceed. This Article is the first to provide
detailed analysis and concrete, step-by-step guidance for regulators
seeking to balance the electoral mandate to provide access to marijuana
products with their ongoing and urgent responsibilities to protect public
health. It provides regulators with the knowledge they need to understand
the constitutional implications of a wide range of options, and to make
choices that implement their public health objectives without provoking
expensive legal challenges.
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INTRODUCTION
Marijuana as a legal and available consumer product is becoming the
reality at the state level, across the nation. Now, after the 2016 election,
“more than half of the states in the U.S. now have comprehensive
medical marijuana laws and roughly one fifth of the population lives in a
1
place where adults 21 and older can legally consume weed for fun.” This
shift reflects the good reasons to de-criminalize marijuana use and to
2
legalize and regularize its cultivation, distribution and retail sale. Some

1

Katy Steinmetz, How the 2016 Election Became a Watershed for Weed, TIME (Nov. 10,
2016), http://time.com/4557472/marijuana-2016-states-legalized.
2
The Editorial Board, Repeal Prohibition, Again, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/07/27/opinion/sunday/high-timemarijuana-legalization.html?_r= (calling for federal de-criminalization of marijuana,
noting the high social costs of criminalization and the debate among scientists as to
health effects, and opining that problems associated with creating systems for
regulating manufacture, sale and marketing are “solvable”).
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3

of these reasons are to promote public health. But the news is not all
4
rosy on the public health front. Very good reasons exist to limit
5
marijuana use by minors and by adults. At least to the supply side,
criminalization is a single, definitive prevention strategy. Legalization
introduces complexity for regulators, who must craft methods to channel
the incentives and behaviors of the many actors in the supply chain away
from dangerous outlets for their marijuana products while the law also
6
allows them to cultivate demand generally.
Legalization also injects the potent tool of advertising and marketing
to promote marijuana into the struggle for persuasive influence between
sellers aimed at increasing profits and regulators trying to minimize the
7
damages to public health. With respect to minors particularly, the
evidence is well established linking advertising of dangerous products,
such as alcohol and tobacco, to early initiation and adverse health
8
consequences that public agencies spending public funds must address.
Short of banning it entirely, government entities charged with promoting
public health have broad authority to limit access to a potentially
dangerous product like marijuana. For example, they can define lawful
attributes of the product, or limit how, where or when the product can
9
be sold. Once some of the marijuana sale transactions become legal,
however, limits on advertising and marketing to reduce adverse public
health consequences become much more difficult to impose because of
the increasingly aggressive interpretations of protections for advertising
10
articulated by the Supreme Court.
3

Natalie McGill, As Marijuana Decriminalization Spreads, Public Health Prepares, THE
NATION’S HEALTH (Sept. 2014) (“Decriminalization has been supported by many
health equity advocates because of disparities in law enforcement and imprisonment
for marijuana possession among U.S. populations.”); Nikhil “Sunny” Patel & J. Wesley
Boyd, It’s Time to Legalize Marijuana: A Public Health Perspective, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY:
ALMOST ADDICTED (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/almostaddicted/201610/its-time-legalize-marijuana-public-health-perspective.
4
McGill, supra note 3, at 1 (“[E]merging research already shows the potential
short- and long-term effects of marijuana use on public health.”).
5
NIDA Review Summarizes Research on Marijuana’s Negative Health Effects, Nat’l Inst.
on Drug Abuse (June 4, 2014), https://www.drugabuse.gov/news-events/newsreleases/2014/06/nida-review-summarizes-research-marijuanas-negative-health-effects.
6
Sam Kamin, Legal Cannabis in the U.S.: Not Whether but How?, 50 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 617, 637–38 (2016).
7
Id. at 652 (“In an unregulated [marijuana] market, there will be no check on
the desire of businesses to increase profits at the expense of customers.”).
8
Reiner Hanewinkel et al., Cigarette Advertising and Teen Smoking Initiation, 127
PEDIATRICS 271, 271–72 (2011), https://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/
pediatrics/127/2/e271.full.pdf (tobacco); Rebecca L. Collins et al., Forging the Link
Between Alcohol and Underage Drinking, RAND CORP. (2006), http://www.
rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9073.html (alcohol).
9
See Kamin, supra note 6, at 642; see, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., OEI-09-91-00654, YOUTH AND ALCOHOL: CONTROLLING ALCOHOL ADVERTISING
THAT APPEALS TO YOUTH (1991).
10
See infra Part II.
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Colorado’s marijuana mantra for edibles is “start low and go slow.”
While this directive is excellent advice for marijuana consumers, it is not
a rule governmental entities should follow with respect to enacting laws
and regulations to protect public health. The histories of other
hazardous products, such as alcohol and tobacco, provide ample
demonstration that the natural outcome of competitive forces producing
and marketing marijuana products will adversely affect public health, if
12
left unchecked. Regulators’ first line of defense must be to regulate the
product qualities, market structure, and sales practices. A second line of
defense must, however, inevitably be to limit potentially hazardous
demand-stoking advertising and marketing practices to the extent
permissible, without provoking costly legal challenges. To do this,
regulators must understand the types of regulations that will provoke
constitutional challenges, and how a court’s analysis of the regulation will
proceed. To the extent that marijuana vendors can plausibly claim that
regulations restrict their communication to customers, regulators must
be prepared, in advance, to present evidence showing how regulations
promote defined public health objectives and why the many other
options in the regulatory tool-kit will not work. Regulators can succeed in
these challenges or, better yet, fend them off by being prepared.
Part I compares the background of imposing restrictions on
marijuana advertising with the regulatory histories of alcohol and
tobacco. While the particular restrictions imposed offer guidance, and
judicial decisions provide principles and illustrate some particular
applications, the fact that many of the advertising and marketing
restrictions in the alcohol and tobacco markets are not imposed by law
and so have not been reviewed by courts limits the guidance they can
provide. Additionally, illegality of marijuana at the federal level changes
the background for marijuana regulators, creating challenges in some
respects and in others, creating an artificial sense of security.
Part II sets out the constitutional spectrum of the types of advertising
and marketing regulations, and the analysis that courts will employ. The
subparts provide self-contained guidance as to the particular types of
restrictions, as well as a comprehensive listing of the range of options
available.
Part III briefly summarizes the steps of analysis that regulators should
employ as they develop a comprehensive strategy to limit the adverse
public health effects of legal marijuana products. This analysis will also
provide help to regulators in their efforts to devise effective and

11
Ana Cabrera & Sara Weisfeldt, NYT’s Dowd Inspires Campaign to Educate Colorado
About Pot Edibles, CNN (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/17/us/
colorado-marijuana-edibles-billboard-maureen-dowd.
12
Kamin, supra note 6, at 652 (“[A]s with the tobacco and alcohol industries,
there is reason to be concerned that a commercial marijuana industry will seek to
profit from the heavy users who account for the overwhelming majority of marijuana
consumed.”).
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defensible regulations to address particular problems that will inevitably
13
become apparent as a legalized marijuana regime unfolds.
I. MARIJUANA COMPARED TO OTHER HEALTH-HAZARD
PRODUCT MARKETING REGIMES
Efforts to regulate advertising of other health-hazard products
provide important guidance for marijuana regulators. This Part briefly
reviews the histories of alcohol and tobacco advertising regulation,
highlighting aspects that will be helpful to marijuana regulators. After
these reviews, it points out the unique challenges faced by marijuana
regulators because the product is illegal federally.
A. Alcohol
For a long time, people have been drinking alcohol—for pleasure,
14
for health, and as a substitute for unsafe drinking water. In the United
States, the temperance movement, spearheaded by religious
organizations, successfully provoked the passage, ratification and
implementation of the Eighteenth Amendment, which outlawed the
15
manufacture, transport and sale of alcohol. In 1933, the Twenty-first
Amendment repealed Prohibition and gave primary authority for the
16
intra-state distribution and sale of alcohol to the individual states.
Regulations vary among states, and within the states, according to the
type of beverage, with higher alcohol content being regulated more
strictly. States generally follow one of two regulatory models—public
monopoly or private licensing—and the models may vary within a state
17
according to the type of beverage. Most states limit their government
monopoly to the sale of distilled spirits. To avoid the problems of vertical
integration, states follow a “three tier” system of alcohol distribution
under which the producers, distributors and retailers must be separately

13
This Article provides general doctrinal guidance and does not constitute or
replace legal advice.
14
Jon P. Nelson, Advertising Bans in the United States, EH.NET ENCYCLOPEDIA (May
20, 2004), https://eh.net/encyclopedia/nelson-adbans.
15
Prohibition: United States History [1920-1933], ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Aug.
11, 2016), https://www.britannica.com/event/Prohibition-United-States-history-19201933.
16
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI §§ 1–2 (“Section 1. The eighteenth article of
amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed. Section 2.
The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the
laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”).
17
Alexander C. Wagenaar & Harold D. Holder, A Change from Public to Private Sale
of Wine: Results from Natural Experiments in Iowa and West Virginia, 52 J. STUD. ON
ALCOHOL 162, 173 (1991) (“Some states set up a monopoly system for distributing
alcohol for off-premise consumption, while others established a system of licensed
private alcohol retailers.”).
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18

owned. To the extent that states permit private sales, an Alcohol
Beverage Control (ABC) agency typically grants licenses and determines
19
the places and conditions of sale. The federal government regulates the
20
interstate alcohol trade. Three agencies administer different aspects of
alcoholic beverage control, which includes marketing, advertising,
21
labeling and promotions.
Governments imposed various prohibitions on alcoholic beverage
advertisements free of constitutional restraint until the United States
Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution to protect commercial
22
speech in the mid-1970s. In two cases, the Court reviewed and struck
down alcohol advertising restrictions specifically. In Rubin v. Coors Brewing
23
Co., the Court invalidated a federal law that prohibited beer labels from
stating alcohol content and in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, it held a
24
state ban on advertising alcohol prices to be unconstitutional. In both
cases, it rejected the “greater-includes-the-lesser” reasoning offered by
the government, under which “because the government could have
enacted a wholesale prohibition of [the product or activity] it is
permissible for the government to take the less intrusive step of allowing
the conduct, but reducing the demand through restrictions on
25
Instead, the Court stated clearly that “the First
advertising.”
Amendment directs that government may not suppress speech as easily as
it may suppress conduct, and that speech restrictions cannot be treated as
simply another means that the government may use to achieve its ends,”
and that this rule applies to commercial, as well as fully protected,
26
speech.
The change in the Court’s interpretation of the scope of the free
speech guarantee prompted changes in alcohol advertising regulations.
Producers of all three types of alcoholic beverages—beer, wine and
distilled spirits—had for many years “self-regulated” through voluntary
advertising codes adopted by their associations (Beer Institute, Wine
27
Institute, and Distilled Spirits Council of the United States). Within a
18

Birth of State Based, Three Tier Alcohol Regulation, MONT. BEER AND WINE DISTRIBS.,
http://mbwda.com/birth-of-state-based-three-tier-alcohol-regulation.
19
TTB Regulated Industries, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX
AND TRADE BUREAU, https://www.ttb.gov (listing United States alcohol beverage
control authorities, state by state).
20
YOUTH AND ALCOHOL, supra note 9.
21
Id. (listing Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; the Federal Drug
Administration; and the Federal Trade Commission as federal regulatory agencies).
22
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 761 (1976) (“[S]peech does not lose its First Amendment protection because
money is spent to project it.”).
23
514 U.S. 476, 478 (1995).
24
517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996).
25
Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 346 (1986).
26
44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 512.
27
See JANET M. EVANS & RICHARD F. KELLY, FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, SELF-
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year of the 44 Liquormart decision, the Distilled Spirits Council
announced that it would remove the ban on television and radio
28
advertising from its Code of Good Conduct. The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) backed away from regulating alcohol advertising and
articulated a policy to rely upon industry self-regulation as the primary
means to achieve the public health goal of avoiding the adverse effects of
29
underage drinking. The codes cover many marketing methods,
ostensibly restricting practices and portrayals that appeal to teens and
college students. With respect to different media, they adopt the rule that
advertisements may not be placed in media where over 30% of the
30
audience is below the legal drinking age. Because these standards are
voluntary, they have not been challenged in court or reviewed under the
increasingly stringent commercial speech standards.
Currently, yearly alcohol advertising expenditures in the United
31
States in “measured media” are over $2 billion. According to the FTC,
these advertisers spend two to three times that amount in unmeasured
promotions, such as “sponsorships, Internet advertising, point-of-sale
materials, product placement, items with brand logos, and other
32
means.” The goal of these marketing practices is to “embed brands in
33
the lives and lifestyles of consumers.” The means include Internet
marketing use of “contests, games, slang, and cartoons;” “[p]aid
placements of products in films, television, books, and video games;”
“[i]dentifying the product with popular music;” and placements in “hip”
34
clubs or media outlets, and sponsorship of concerts and events. Studies
confirm that underage drinking positively correlates to advertising
35
exposure. Not surprisingly, researchers have concluded that industry

REGULATION IN THE ALCOHOL INDUSTRY: A REVIEW OF INDUSTRY EFFORTS TO AVOID
PROMOTING ALCOHOL TO UNDERAGE CONSUMERS (1999).
28
Stuart Elliott, Liquor Industry Ends Its Ad Ban in Broadcasting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8,
1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/11/08/business/liquor-industry-ends-its-ad-ban-inbroadcasting.html.
29

JANET M. EVANS & RICHARD F. KELLY, supra note 27, at 2–3; JANET M. EVANS ET
AL., FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N ALCOHOL MARKETING AND ADVERTISING: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS, at i (2003).
30

James F. Mosher, Alcohol Industry Voluntary Regulation of Its Advertising Practices:
A Status Report, CTR. FOR ALCOHOL MKTG. AND YOUTH 2 (Feb. 2006), http://
www.camy.org/_docs/washingtonupdate/industrycode.pdf.
31
Kantar Media & OAAA, Advertising Spending of the Beer, Wine and Liquor Industry
in the United States in 2013, by Medium (in Thousand U.S. Dollars), STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/245318/advertising-spending-of-the-alcohol-industryin-the-us-by-medium.
32

David Jernigan & James O’Hara, Alcohol Advertising and Promotion, in REDUCING
UNDERAGE DRINKING: A COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 625, 625 (Richard J. Bonnie &
Mary Ellen O’Connell eds., 2004).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Timothy S. Naimi et al., Amount of Televised Alcohol Advertising Exposure and the
Quantity of Alcohol Consumed by Youth, 77 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 723, 723 (2016).
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standards designed to protect against these practices leave holes that
allow youth exposure in excess of the guidelines and enforcement of the
36
standards is “lax.”
B. Tobacco
As with alcohol, people have been using tobacco products for many
centuries. By the 1700s, people had recognized that the products were
37
addictive and documented some the adverse health effects. In the late
1800s, mechanized production made inexpensive cigarettes available,
38
and because they were sold individually, accessible to children. By 1890,
39
over half the states and territories had established minimum-age laws.
40
Between 1895 and 1921, fifteen states completely banned cigarette sales.
In 1929, the first statistical link between smoking tobacco and lung
41
cancer was reported. By 1939, all states had enacted minimum-age laws
42
for purchase of tobacco products. Starting around this time, the FTC
began to issue complaints against tobacco companies, identifying various
43
advertising claims as “unfair and deceptive.” In 1964, the Surgeon
General’s advisory committee reported that cigarette smoking presents a
44
substantial health hazard. Congress enacted the Federal Cigarette
45
Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA) in 1965. The FCLAA required a
health warning on cigarette packages and also required the FTC to
report annually to Congress on the effectiveness of cigarette labeling and
current practices and methods of cigarette advertising and promotion,
and to offer such recommendations for legislation as it deemed
46
appropriate. In 1970, Congress strengthened the statement to read:
“Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette
47
Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health.” The required warnings have

36

Jernigan & O’Hara, supra note 32.
Dorie E. Apollonio & Stanton A. Glantz, Minimum Ages of Legal Access for
Tobacco in the United States from 1863 to 2015, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1200, 1201 (2016)
(European studies document that smoking out of a pipe may cause cancers of the lips
and throat).
38
Id.
39
Id. (the minimum age varied from 14 to 24).
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Nelson, supra note 14.
44
Apollonio & Glantz, supra note 37, at 1201.
45
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79
Stat. 282 (1966) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1341).
46
Id. at 1333–1334; Nelson, supra note 14.
47
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1338 (2012)); Arlen W. Langvardt,
Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment: Striking the Right Balance, 5 WM. & MARY
BUS. L. REV. 331, 338 (2014).
37
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48

since changed twice more. Two courts of appeal reached different
results as to the constitutionality of the most recent graphic warning
mandated by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of
49
2009 (Tobacco Control Act) and implemented by the Food and Drug
50
Administration (FDA). In response to the invalidation, the FDA
51
removed the mandate and has yet to propose new warnings.
Congress’s 1970 amendments also banned cigarette advertisements
52
from radio and television. A split three-judge panel upheld it against a
53
constitutional challenge and the Supreme Court affirmed. Tobacco
companies were not the original challengers, and have not brought a
renewed challenge to the ban, so it remains untested under the Court’s
54
increasingly stringent commercial speech jurisprudence.
Starting in the mid-1980s, tobacco companies began to work
aggressively through Congress, and through state legislatures, to pass laws
prohibiting lower levels of government from regulating their products,
55
practices and advertisements. So, as the Court tightened the
constitutional protections for advertising, preemption provisions in new
laws presented hurdles for regulators as well. In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
56
Reilly, the Court reviewed state labeling and advertising regulations. It
held that Congress had preempted the advertising and labeling
57
requirements applied to cigarettes. It reviewed the advertising
restrictions applied to other tobacco products, upholding some and
58
finding others to be insufficiently well-tailored, and offered observations
48
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 2000 Surgeon General’s Report
Highlights: Warning Labels, https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/sgr/2000/
highlights/labels/index.htm.
49
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123
Stat. 1776, 1843 (2009) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d)(2012)).
50
Compare Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 554–
69 (6th Cir. 2012) (upholding graphic warnings) with R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.
FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1218–21 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (invalidating graphic warnings).
51
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Cigarette Graphic Health Warnings (Mar. 23, 2017),
https://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/Labeling/ucm257774.html.
52
15 U.S.C. § 1335 (2012).
53
Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 586 (D.D.C. 1971), affirmed by
Capital Broad. Co. v. Acting Attorney Gen., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
54
Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 4401–4408 (2012) (Prohibits smokeless tobacco advertising on television and
radio); Langvardt, supra note 47, at 342 (explaining that cigarette companies may be
content with the ban and a trade-off for freedom to advertise elsewhere).
55
NAT’L CANCER INST., STATE AND LOCAL LEGISLATIVE ACTION TO REDUCE TOBACCO
USE 51 (Donald R. Shopland ed., 2000) (“[T]he promotion of preemptive legislation
at the state and federal level has now become the tobacco industry’s chief strategy for
eradicating local tobacco control ordinances.”).
56
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
57
Id. at 551.
58
Id. at 565–66 (“A careful calculation of the costs of a speech regulation does
not mean that a State must demonstrate that there is no incursion on legitimate
speech interests, but a speech regulation cannot unduly impinge on the speaker’s
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that provide important guidance for regulators seeking to restrict
advertising to protect children’s health. The Court agreed that “the
State’s interest in preventing underage tobacco use is substantial, and
even compelling,” but it noted that on the other side of the balance, “it is
no less true that the sale and use of tobacco products by adults is a legal
activity,” and so long as it is, “tobacco retailers and manufacturers have
an interest in conveying truthful information about their products to
adults, and adults have a corresponding interest in receiving truthful
59
information about tobacco products.”
A number of tobacco advertising restrictions stem from the Master
Settlement Agreement of 1998, through which the four largest tobacco
companies in the U.S. settled claims brought by the Attorneys General of
46 states and the District of Columbia for health care payments made by
60
the states for tobacco-related diseases. Prohibited practices include
direct and indirect targeting of youth; use of cartoon characters (“Joe
Camel”); use of billboards, transit advertisements, and other outdoor
advertising not in direct proximity to a retail establishment that sells
tobacco products; product placements in entertainment media; free
tobacco product samples, with exceptions for adult-only facilities; gifts to
youth in exchange for proofs of purchase; branded merchandise; and
61
brand name sponsorships.
In 2009, the Tobacco Control Act imposed further advertising
restrictions and granted the FDA the authority to regulate many aspects
of tobacco products, including marketing and advertising, which the
62
Court had previously deemed unconstitutional. It put in place specific
63
restrictions on marketing tobacco products to children. In addition to
banning sales to minors, the Act restricts vending machine sales, with
exceptions in adult-only facilities; bans the sale of packages of fewer than
20 cigarettes; bans tobacco-brand sponsorships of sports and
entertainment events or other social or cultural events; bans free
giveaways of sample cigarettes and brand-name non-tobacco promotional
items; and restricts free samples of smokeless tobacco, with exceptions in
64
qualifying adult-only facilities. Tobacco manufacturers challenged most

ability to propose a commercial transaction and the adult listener’s opportunity to
obtain information about products.”).
59
Id. at 564.
60
TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, THE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT:
AN OVERVIEW (2015), http://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/
resources/tclc-fs-msa-overview-2015.pdf.
61
Id.
62
21 U.S.C. § 387a (2012).
63
Id. §§ 387a-1, 387c, 387f-1, 387g.
64
Id. §§ 387a-1, 387f-1, 387g; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Overview of the Family
Smoking
Prevention
and
Tobacco
Control
Act
(Nov.
2015),
http://
government.report/Resources/Whitepapers/d3c9325f-9933-4cdd-969535b8c4f00885_FamSmkngPreventionTCA_FNL_508.pdf.
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of these provisions, and a Sixth Circuit panel upheld them. The court,
however, invalidated regulations that restricted the use of color and
66
imagery on cigarette packages and in most tobacco advertising, finding
that “these forms of advertising ha[ve] great expressive value for the
tobacco industry, and its suppression would be an undue burden on
67
Plaintiffs’ free speech.”
C. Marijuana
Marijuana is currently an illegal product at the federal level and in a
68
majority of states. This has not always been the case. Through the first
69
third of the twentieth century, marijuana—or cannabis —like opiates
and cocaine, was sold in drug stores in liquid form, refined as hashish,
70
and used as an ingredient in over-the-counter medicines. Sellers could
market and advertise these products freely. An 1862 Vanity Fair
advertisement for “hasheesh candy” claimed it to be a “wonderful
Medicinal Agent for the cure of Nervousness, Weakness, [and]
Melancholy,” as well as a “pleasurable and harmless stimulant” that
71
provides “all classes” with “new inspiration and energy.” “The federal
government first regulated marijuana in 1937, when Congress passed the
Marijuana Tax Act,” which ostensibly was a revenue measure that
72
essentially prohibited the product. The Boggs Act followed in 1952,
which “provided stiff mandatory sentences for offenses involving a variety
73
of drugs, including marijuana.” In 1970, Congress passed the
Controlled Substances Act, “which established categories, or schedules,
into which individual drugs were placed depending on their perceived
74
medical usefulness and potential for abuse.” “Schedule 1, the most
restrictive category, contained drugs that the federal government
75
deemed as having no valid medical uses and a high potential for abuse.”

65

Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 518 (6th Cir.

2012).
66

21 C.F.R. § 1140.32 (2016).
Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 547.
68
Jeremy Berke, Jeff Sessions Says He Will Enforce Federal Marijuana Laws, BUS.
INSIDER (Mar. 9, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/sessions-says-he-will-enforcefederal-weed-laws-2017-3.
69
Jon Gettman, Marijuana vs. Cannabis: Pot-Related Terms to Use and Words We
Should Lose, HIGH TIMES (Sept. 10, 2015), http://hightimes.com/culture/marijuanavs-cannabis-pot-related-terms-to-use-and-words-we-should-lose/.
70
Stephen Siff, The Illegalization of Marijuana: A Brief History, ORIGINS (May 2014),
http://origins.osu.edu/article/illegalization-marijuana-brief-history.
71
Id.
72
Scott C. Martin, A Brief History of Marijuana Law in America, TIME (Apr. 20,
2016), http://time.com/4298038/marijuana-history-in-america.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
67
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Marijuana was placed into Schedule 1, in addition to heroin and LSD.
Thus far, the Drug Enforcement Administration has refused calls to
77
Possessing, growing, and
reconsider marijuana’s classification.
78
In response to
distributing marijuana remain federal crimes.
legalization of various uses by states, the Department of Justice during
the Obama Administration issued a memorandum reciting federal
enforcement priorities and its intent to defer to state regulatory
authorities to manage other areas, which provided some room for states
79
to allow marijuana cultivation, distribution, and sale. The position of
the new administration with respect to marijuana crime enforcement is
80
not clear. Whatever the federal enforcement position may be, the
illegality of marijuana at the federal level changes the landscape in a
number of ways for regulators seeking to curtail marketing and
advertising of state-legalized marijuana from that presented in the
contexts of alcohol or tobacco.
1. Federal Regulatory Support or Interference
With respect to the legal alcohol and cigarette products, state
regulators can piggyback their own efforts on the actions and output of
81
the many parts of the federal bureaucracy focused on the same product.
These actions include laws by Congress setting policy objectives and
creating agencies, actions by agencies created to regulate the health and
safety of the product, and studies paid for by government funds of public
health impacts and the efficacy of various regulatory options short of
76

Id.
Carrie Johnson, DEA Rejects Attempt to Loosen Federal Restrictions on Marijuana,
NPR (Aug. 10, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/08/10/489509471/dea-rejectsattempt-to-loosen-federal-restrictions-on-marijuana.
78
Federal Marijuana Law, AMERICANS FOR SAFE ACCESS, http://www.
safeaccessnow.org/federal_marijuana_law (Possession, up to 1 year for a first time
offense; cultivation, anywhere between 5 years to life depending on the amount being
produced; and Distribution, 5 years or more depending on the amount).
79
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE REGARDING MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT (Aug. 29,
2013), reprinted in 26 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 4, 217•18 (2014); Marijuana Policy Project,
Federal Enforcement Policy, MPP.org, https://www.mpp.org/federal/federal-enforcementpolicy-on-state-marijuana-laws.
80
Andrew Blake, Governors from Marijuana States Plea with Trump Administration to
Keep Pot Policies in Place, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2017/apr/4/governors-marijuana-states-plea-trump-administrati;
Polly
Washburn, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein: “From a legal and scientific perspective,
marijuana is an unlawful drug,” CANNABIST (June 13, 2017), http://
77

www.thecannabist.co/2017/06/13/rod-rosenstein-marijuawarnerna-unlawful-schedulei/81433/ (Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein stated “[m]aybe there will be

changes to [the Cole Memorandum] in the future but we’re still operating under
that policy which is an effort to balance the conflicting interests with regard to
marijuana.”).
81
JAMES F. MOSHER & ELENA N. COHEN, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. SCH. OF PUB.
HEALTH, CTR. ON ALCOHOL MARKETING AND YOUTH, STATE LAWS TO REDUCE THE IMPACT
OF ALCOHOL MARKETING ON YOUTH: CURRENT STATUS AND MODEL POLICIES 4 (2012)
(describing the interaction of federal and state laws regulating alcohol marketing).
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82

entire prohibition. Several federal agencies oversee the marketing and
advertising of alcohol and cigarettes, engage in rulemaking, impose
requirements relating to truth in advertising, disclose dangers, and create
83
labeling requirements to provide consumers information.
84
None of these types of assistance exist for marijuana. Neither the
federal government nor other states exist as open laboratories of
experiment for regulatory options with respect to health, safety, or
marketing and advertising. The illegality of marijuana not only leads to a
dearth of regulatory assistance but also a lack of critical information
upon which regulations are based. Federal illegality leads to a lack of
funding for marijuana research and numerous others barriers and
85
disincentives. These restrictions severely limit the ability of states to gain
the information necessary to draw effective conclusions to impose
regulations on marijuana products and marketing and advertising
86
themselves.
Marijuana regulators also face a different landscape with respect to
federal interference because of the blanket illegality of the product at the
federal level. Until marijuana can be marketed legally at the federal level,
the threat of piecemeal preemption of various state and local regulatory
innovations through newly enacted federal laws is much less than with
87
legal products, such as cigarettes. The threat of preemption through the
82
83

Id. at 3.
See, e.g., Cigarette Report for 2013, FED. TRADE COMM’N (2016), https://www.

ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-cigarette-report-2013/
2013cigaretterpt.pdf (describing laws that apply to tobacco marketing); Truth in
Advertising, FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/
truth-advertising (describing laws that prohibit fraud and require truth in advertising);

TTB Regulated Industries, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND
TRADE BUREAU, https://www.ttb.gov/ (describing operations of the Alcohol and
Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau); Alcohol Advertising, FED. TRADE COMM’N. (Sept.
2013), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0391-alcohol-advertising (describing
the Federal Trade Commission’s oversight of alcohol advertising and marketing).
84
Jequetta Byrd & Laura Lieberman, Marijuana in America, 2015: A Survey of
Federal and States’ Responses to Marijuana Legalization and Taxation, BLOOMBERG BNA
(Nov. 13, 2015), https://www.bna.com/marijuana-america-2015-n57982063540 (noting
that a bill introduced by Rep. Jared Polis’s (D-Colo.) H.R. 1013, introduced Feb. 20,
2015, proposed legalizing marijuana possession and transactions, and along with that,
proposed transferring jurisdiction over marijuana enforcement from the Drug
Enforcement Administration to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives; and renaming the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau the
Alcohol, Tobacco and Marijuana Tax and Trade Bureau).
85
See Bob Grant, National Academies Detail the State of Weed Science, SCIENTIST (Jan.
12,
2017),
http://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/47980/title/
National-Academies-Detail-the-State-of-Weed-Science; John Hudak and Grace
Wallack, Ending the U.S. Government’s War on Medical Marijuana Research, BROOKINGS
INST. (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/research/ending-the-u-s-governmentswar-on-medical-marijuana-research/.
86
See Grant, supra note 85.
87
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 551 (2001) (federal marketing
restrictions preempt state laws); Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control
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Controlled Substances Act, however, clearly exists, although the extent of
88
preemption is not at all clear. For local regulators, the threat of
preemption through industry-sponsored provisions in state regulations
89
exists as well.
2. State Monopoly
States can choose from a number of distribution models for health90
hazard products. A “wealth of information” supports the conclusion that
state-run alcohol distribution monopolies “are better for public health
91
than less regulated options.” This model best promotes public health in
part because it is the most effective in limiting aggressive marketing
92
techniques, including all different types of product advertising. Despite
93
these potential benefits, a state-run distribution system is not a realistic
94
option so long as marijuana remains illegal federally. According to one
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776, § 387p(2)(A) (2009) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 1333(d) (2012)) (preempting state and local governments from
regulating tobacco product standards, premarket review, manufacturing practices,
labeling, and product registration).
88
Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J. OF HEALTH
CARE L. & POL’Y 5, 6–8 (2013).
89
James F. Mosher, The Perils of Preemption, in AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION:
ALCOHOL ISSUES 2 (2001) (noting that state-level preemption is one of the alcohol
industry’s “most potent weapons” against local public health regulations); Preemption:
The Biggest Challenge to Tobacco Control, TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM (2014)
(same issue with respect to tobacco companies).
90
JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., RAND CORP. CONSIDERING MARIJUANA
LEGALIZATION: INSIGHTS FOR VERMONT AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS 49 ( 2015) (surveying
regulatory options).
91
Id. at 61.
92
Id. at 62 (“[I]if a government monopoly controlled supply, firms would have
no incentive to spend their money promoting consumption of the government’s
product, even if they technically retained that [constitutional] right. So placing the
entire distribution system in the government’s hands sidesteps concerns about
commercial advertising.”); Robin Room, Why Have a Retail Alcohol Monopoly?, CTR. FOR
SOCIAL RESEARCH ON ALCOHOL AND DRUGS, STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY (2001),
http://www.robinroom.net/retail.htm (“The fundamental justification for a
government retail monopoly is that it occupies a field which otherwise would be
occupied by private interests in competition with each other. . . . In line with their
duty of social responsibility, government retail monopolies are typically more
restrained in sales promotions than would be true for a privatized retail market.”).
93
CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 90, at 62 (recognizing that “[l]imiting advertising is
a mixed blessing” and “losing [advertising’s information and efficiency] functions
represents a real loss to society,” but noting that “the loss could be partially offset by
peer-to-peer sharing of user-generated information, which has long been prominent
for marijuana, perhaps because of the scarcity of traditional advertising”).
94
Joel Warner, Marijuana Legalization: Should Bernie Sanders’ Home State Embrace
Socialized Cannabis?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2016), http://www.ibtimes.com/
marijuana-legalization-should-bernie-sanders-home-state-embrace-socialized-cannabis2276680 (“[L]ikely the biggest reason of all options like a state-run program aren’t
getting more attention is that many people worry having state workers sell marijuana
would put Vermont on a collision course with the federal government”); id. (quoting
a co-author of a report to Vermont on regulatory options to say: “[B]ecause of the
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of the co-authors of a report to Vermont assessing regulatory options,
“[B]ecause of the government prohibition, most states aren’t really
talking about [a state-run monopoly] because they don’t want to put
95
their employees at risk of arrest.” Although it is possible for a state to
96
create a private monopoly, this model would not achieve the benefits of
a monopoly run by an entity with a public mandate to promote public
97
health in addition to raising revenue. In sum, so long as marijuana
remains illegal federally, states will need to cede control of the
distribution process to private actors with profit-generation motives that
incentivize aggressive marketing and advertising. This reality means that
states seeking to avoid the public health costs of youth and intemperate
adult marijuana use will need to navigate the constitutional minefield of
marketing and advertising regulations.
3. Does the Federal Constitution Apply?
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits
98
governments at all levels from “abridging the freedom of speech.” This
99
guarantee is not absolute, even with respect to core political speech.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment’s protection to
100
extend to commercial advertising. Some boundaries of this protection

government prohibition, most states aren’t really talking about this because they
don’t want to put their employees at risk of arrest”); Pat Oglesby, Marijuana
Advertising: The Federal Tax Stalemate, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 25, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/pat-oglesby/marijuana-advertising-the_b_3810341.html

(“[The state-monopoly] model, free of the profit motive, provides the least possible
incentive for advertising—and it’s the model Uruguay is using for marijuana. But
using the monopoly model would mean the state would sell marijuana itself and
violate federal law—which continues to outlaw marijuana.”).
95
Warner, supra note 94.
96
Tim Fernholz, The Next US State Voting to Legalize Pot Would Also Create the First
Marijuana Grower Monopoly, QUARTZ (Nov. 2, 2015), https://qz.com/538861/the-nextus-state-voting-to-legalize-pot-would-also-create-the-first-marijuana-grower-monopoly
(describing the private monopoly that would have been created through a 2016 ballot
initiative to legalize recreational marijuana: “The Ohio bill would authorize 10
production facilities to serve as the only legal sources of marijuana within the state—
and the land for these parcels is owned by the backers of the proposition. These
facilities would be exempt from local regulation and taxed at a level set by the
referendum”).
97
See Warner, supra note 94 (quoting Beau Kilmer, co-director of RAND’s Drug
Policy Research Center and co-author of a report to Vermont assessing distribution
options, “[i]f you are thinking about this from a public-health perspective and are
still trying to bring in state revenue, the approach that probably makes the most sense
is the government monopoly”).
98
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
99
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 262 (2002)) (government may
restrict speech when it has a compelling purpose and the means are narrowly tailored
to fulfill it).
100
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976).
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101

are in flux. A critical aspect of the Court’s interpretation that is not
likely to change is that First Amendment protection for an advertisement
102
applies only if it promotes a “lawful” product or service. Marijuana is
103
not lawful at the federal level. One court and some commentators have
concluded that this means that the federal Constitution’s free speech
guarantee does not protect marijuana advertising in states where it is
104
legal.
It is not at all clear, however, that other courts will agree. In Bigelow
105
v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that a Virginia statute making it a
misdemeanor to encourage the procurement of an abortion violated the
First Amendment when the statute was applied to a Virginia newspaper
editor who had published an advertisement from a New York abortion
referral service regarding legal abortions in New York. Courts have read
this holding as articulating “a strong position against the constitutionality
of a prohibition by one locality . . . on advertising regarding activities
106
lawful in another locality.” These courts have “interpreted Bigelow to
mean that an activity is ‘lawful’ under the Central Hudson test so long as it
107
is lawful where it will occur.” Bigelow, which deals with different
101

See infra Part I.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980) (“[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of
commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity.”).
103
Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. Montana, 368 P.3d 1131, 1150 (Mont. 2016)
(“[A]n activity that is not permitted by federal law—even if permitted by state law—is
not a ‘lawful activity’ within the meaning of Central Hudson’s first factor.”).
104
Jacob Sullum, Are Marijuana Ad Restrictions Constitutional?, REASON (Mar. 15,
2013), http://reason.com/blog/2013/03/15/are-marijuana-ad-restrictions-constituti
(“Since marijuana is still prohibited by federal law, a First Amendment challenge to
advertising restrictions like those suggested by the task force would not be viable.”);
Jacob Sullum, Legalize It, But Don’t Advertise It: High Times Fights Colorado’s Restrictions
on Marijuana-Related Speech, FORBES (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
102

jacobsullum/2014/08/28/legalize-it-but-dont-advertise-it-high-times-fights-coloradosonerous-restrictions-on-marijuana-related-speech/#4be33acb4656 (quoting UCLA law

Professor Eugene Volokh: “I don’t see how marijuana sales are lawful, given the
federal prohibition, so I think advertising marijuana is not protected under
commercial speech doctrine”); Alex Kreit, What Will Federal Marijuana Reform Look
Like? 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 689, 714 (2015) (“Federal prohibition . . . allow[s] for a
complete ban on marijuana advertising because there is no First Amendment right to
advertise the sale of an illegal good.”).
105
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975).
106
Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. City of Worcester, 851 F. Supp. 2d 311,
315 (D. Mass. 2012).
107
Id. (citing Katt v. Dykhouse, 983 F.2d 690, 696 (6th Cir. 1992); Record
Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, 638 F.2d 916, 937 (6th Cir. 1980), rev’d on
other grounds, 456 U.S. 968 (1982); Wash. Mercantile Ass’n v. Williams, 733 F.2d 687,
691 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592, 607 (9th Cir.
2010) (“It is consistent with fundamental precepts of our federal system that the law
of the jurisdiction where the transaction is proposed should govern the legality of
those transactions, as citizens of one state ordinarily are free to travel to another state
and have their behavior governed by the law of that second state.”).
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judgments about the lawfulness of an activity by coequal sovereigns, does
not fully address the jurisprudential status of selling marijuana where the
activity is simultaneously lawful under state law but unlawful under
108
As a matter of
federal law in the place “where it will occur.”
enforcement authority, the federal judgment that the activity is unlawful
109
clearly prevails. But as a matter of constitutional free speech protection,
110
where the Court has been ratcheting up protections for advertisements
and condemning restrictions that keep consumers “in the dark” to
111
promote government policies, it seems unlikely that it, the ultimate
arbiter, would allow a state that has legalized the sale of marijuana to
regulate by suppressing speech that, according to the Court, consumers
112
very much need and value highly. Lower courts, which will issue the
first interpretations, may reasonably read the Court’s precedent in this
way. At the very least, litigants will raise the federal constitutional issue
and argue it strenuously, imposing costs on regulators and causing
113
delays. Moreover, many state constitutions have similar free speech
114
guarantees that protect advertising. Colorado and California, two states
that have legalized the sale of marijuana, have constitutions that protect
advertisements at least as much as the constitutional free speech
115
California’s Supreme Court has explicitly likened its
guarantee.
methodology in interpreting the state constitutional commercial speech
108

Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d at 315 (citing Bigelow, 421
U.S. at 824).
109
U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2 (federal laws made pursuant to the Constitution are
the “supreme law of the land”).
110
See supra Part II.B.1.b.
111
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996); see supra Part
II.B.1.b.ii.
112
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 763 (1976) (“As to the particular consumer’s interest in the free flow of
commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his
interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.”).
113
Trans-High Corp. v. Brohl, No. 14-CV-00370-MSK-MJW, 2014 WL 4063354 (D.
Colo. Aug. 18, 2014) (challenging marijuana advertising restrictions and basing free
speech claims on the United States Constitution, dismissed for lack of standing).
114
Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, 12 P.3d 720, 736 (Cal. 2000); Kasky v. Nike,
Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939, 959 (2002); Sullum, Marijuana Ad Restrictions, supra note 104.
115
Gerawan Farming, 12 P.3d at 734 (“[A]s to the points noted in our discussion
of the First Amendment’s free speech clause and its right to freedom of speech,
Article I’s free speech clause and its right to freedom of speech, mutatis mutandis, are
at least in accord” (emphasis in original)); id. at 736 (“[A]rticle I’s right to freedom
of speech protects commercial speech, at least in the form of truthful and
nonmisleading messages about lawful products and services.”); Jacob Sullum, Would
Colorado’s Courts Overturn Restrictions on Marijuana Ads?, REASON: HIT & RUN (Mar. 18,
2013),
https://reason.com/blog/2013/03/18/will-colorados-courts-overturn-restricti
(quoting a Colorado lawyer who specializes in free speech: “The Colorado Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that Article II, Section 10, of the state constitution, which
prohibits any law impairing the freedom of speech and promises that ‘every person
shall be free to speak, write or publish whatever he will on any subject,’ is more
protective than the First Amendment”).

LCB_21_4_Article_5_Jacobs (Do Not Delete)

1098

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

2/7/2018 7:25 PM

[Vol. 21:4

protection to the tests and categories articulated by the United States
116
Supreme Court. Additionally, marijuana could become lawful, at least
117
which would mean that
in some respects, under federal law,
advertisements would certainly receive First Amendment protection. For
all of these reasons, regulators should assume that United States
Supreme Court commercial speech precedent will guide the analysis of
marijuana marketing and advertising restrictions.
4. Barriers to Advertising that Stem from Federal Illegality
In addition to the obstacles that face regulators, marijuana vendors
in states that have legalized the product face a number of disincentives
and difficulties to advertise that stem from federal illegality. As with the
other differences noted above, these forces acting on distributors are part
of the legal landscape that state regulators must understand and
incorporate into their policy plans.
The most obvious disincentive is the threat of prosecution for
118
engaging in the federal crime of selling a Schedule I narcotic. Sellers
may experience this disincentive and craft their advertisements in ways
119
that refer to the product indirectly. Broadcasters may also fear adverse
120
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which
action.

116

Kasky, 27 Cal. 4th at 959 (“This court has never suggested that the state and
federal Constitutions impose different boundaries between the categories of commercial
and noncommercial speech” (emphasis in original)).
117
Patrick Oglesby, Marijuana Legalization Grows Closer with Senate Tax Proposal,
HILL (Apr. 9, 2017), http://origin-nyi.thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/economybudget/327694-marijuana-legalization-grows-closer-with-senate-tax.
118
David Oxenford, The Murky State of Rules on Broadcast Advertising of Marijuana
Products in States Which Have Legalized Its Sale or Use, BROAD. LAW BLOG (Feb. 20, 2016),
http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2016/02/articles/the-murky-state-of-rules-onbroadcast-advertising-of-marijuana-products-in-states-which-have-legalized-its-sale-oruse (“Promoting a business that is not legal under Federal law is dangerous.”).
119
All Things Considered, The Growing Industry of Marijuana Advertising, NPR
(Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/04/06/299913844/the-growing-industryof-marijuana-advertising (noting that an advertising clip doesn’t mention marijuana,
“but it seems pretty clear that when they’re talking about”); Erik Devaney, Marijuana
Marketing: Can the Blossoming Cannabis Industry Overcome “Stoner” Stereotypes?, HUBSPOT
(Apr. 20, 2015), https://blog.hubspot.com/marketing/marijuana-marketing#sm.
0000nqloofgzjeh7pq81xxpmpb3bb (noting that “something is noticeably missing
from dàmà’s marijuana billboard,” which shows “a high-quality photo of a backpackclad couple on a mountaintop, accompanied by some very professional-looking
branding [and] looks like it could be advertising mountain climbing shoes, or an
energy drink, or a number of other products;” claiming that the advertiser’s purpose
is to “tak[e] a more sophisticated approach to their marketing—i.e., portraying an
active, natural lifestyle as opposed to simply displaying product” and thereby “help[]
to reshape the public’s perception of marijuana and marijuana users,” while also
noting that “[a]t the federal level, it’s still technically illegal to advertise marijuana
and marijuana-related products”).
120
Dan Adams, For Marijuana Advertisers, Options are Limited, BOSTON GLOBE (Mar.
1,
2017),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/03/01/for-marijuanaadvertisers-options-are-limited/bNLDg38KHaqRvP4lwFggJN/story.html.
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regulates broadcasters, “has provided no advice whatsoever.” Careful
analysis of the FCC’s actions and guidance with respect to other products
122
may suggest that adverse action against broadcasters is unlikely.
Nevertheless, cautious broadcasters may choose to heed the advice that
“as regulated entities[, they] need to be very restrained in their desires to
123
run ads for these dispensaries that appear to be legal under state laws.”
Nonregulated entities, such as media companies, “generally avoid selling
124
ad space to businesses in the cannabis industry.” Facebook, Twitter,
Google, and other search engines also do not allow marijuana
125
advertising. These private responses to federal illegality are part of the
background against which regulators must form current policies, but they
are unpredictable and cannot be relied upon to remain constant as social
attitudes and marijuana laws change.
Another advertising disincentive stems from the special treatment of
marijuana business expenses in the federal tax code. Somewhat oddly,
federal law requires sellers to pay taxes on income earned from illegal
126
transactions. A benefit that goes along with the tax liability is the ability
to deduct business expenses incurred through illegal transactions in the
127
same way as otherwise. These expenses include “perfectly normal”
selling expenses such as “travel, utilities, salaries[;]” “state taxes or fees
128
paid to comply with the law and to file tax returns[;]” and “advertising.”
129
But this is not so for sales of marijuana. The Federal Income Tax
121

Oxenford, supra note 118.
Judy Endejan, Can Puff the Magic Dragon Lawfully Advertise His Wares?, 31
COMMC’NS LAWYER 16 (2015) (noting that analogous FCC regulations of lotteries
suggest the FCC would not act adversely against a broadcaster who ran an
advertisement for marijuana in a state where it is illegal, and that changed social
mores may reduce the possibility that the FCC would deny a license based on listener
complaints).
123
Oxenford, supra note 118.
124
Devaney, supra note 119.
125
Matt Ferner, Marijuana Ads Banned on Google, Facebook and Twitter, HUFFINGTON
POST (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/22/google-facebookban-marijuana_n_4646916.html (quoting a Facebook representative: “The legality
around the sale and use of marijuana greatly varies around the world, . . . which is
part of the reason why we strictly prohibit the promotion of the sale and use of the
drug itself. The risk of attempting to allow ads promoting the drug in certain states or
countries where it is legal is too high for us to consider at this time”).
126
I.R.S. OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, CHIEF COUNSEL MEMORANDUM NO.
2015504011 2 (Jan. 23, 2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/201504011.pdf
(“Though a medical marijuana business is illegal under federal law, it remains
obligated to pay federal income tax on its taxable income because § 61(a) does not
differentiate between income derived from legal sources and income derived from
illegal sources.”).
127
Id. at 3.
128
Oglesby, supra note 94.
129
A tax benefit that marijuana sellers continue to receive so long as the product
remains illegal is no federal excise tax. Byrd and Lieberman, supra note 84 (noting
that a proposed House bill would both legalize marijuana sales and impose an excise
122
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Code’s section 280E says taxpayers “trafficking in controlled substances”
get “no deduction” for any expenses beyond the cost of producing or
130
buying inventory. Dispensaries may be able to recover costs incurred
through services, such as palliative care, provided by their separate, lawful
131
132
business. Nevertheless, the core prohibition of 280E remains the law.
The treatment of marijuana business expenses is an “aberration”
compared to the deductibility of expenses related to the sale of other
133
illegal products and services. Tax scholars have argued that a more
rational policy would treat businesses that sell marijuana the same as
those that engage in other profit-generating transactions that are illegal
134
under federal law. Members of the marijuana industry listed “the
federal tax situation” as take-away number one from a recent conference,
calling it “the biggest threat to [marijuana] businesses” which “could
135
push the entire industry underground.” Others have observed that the
continued existence of Section 280E at the federal level, and perhaps a
counterpart in the state tax code, creates an opportunity for state
regulators to achieve the public benefits of reduced marijuana
advertising in a way that does not violate the federal or state
136
constitutions. Regulators seeking to manage the relationship between
marijuana advertising and public harms must take into account the
incentives created by various tax strategies, both those within their
tax on marijuana products).
130
26 U.S.C. § 280E (2012) (“Expenditures in connection with the illegal sale of
drugs. No deduction or credit shall be allowed for any amount paid or incurred
during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business if such trade or business
(or the activities which comprise such trade or business) consists of trafficking in
controlled substances (within the meaning of schedule I and II of the Controlled
Substances Act) which is prohibited by Federal law or the law of any State in which
such trade or business is conducted.”).
131
Californians Helping to Alleviate Med. Problems, Inc., v. Comm’r, 128 T.C.
173, 174 (2007).
132
I.R.S. OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, supra note 126, at 4; Californians Helping, 128
T.C. 173.
133
Oglesby, supra note 94.
134
Carrie F. Keller, The Implications of I.R.C. § 280E in Denying Ordinary and
Necessary Business Expenses to Drug Traffickers, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 157, 158 (2003);
Robert W. Wood, Harvard Law School Offers “Tax Planning For Marijuana Dealers” – No
Joke, FORBES (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2013/04/
25/harvard-law-school-offers-tax-planning-for-marijuana-dealers-no-joke/#e4d4dee65775;
Joel S. Newman, CHAMP: How the Tax Court Finessed a Bad Statute, 116 TAX NOTES 887,
888 (2007) (“[A]ll criminals should be treated the same. . . . Why should drug dealers
be treated one way and prostitutes another?”).
135
Marijuana Business Conference Wrapup: 36 Tips, Lessons & Takeaways for the
Cannabis Industry, MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY (Nov. 15, 2012), http://mjbizdaily.com/
marijuana-business-conference-wrapup-36-tips-lessons-take-aways-for-the-cannabis-industry.
136
Oglesby, supra note 94 (“280E does not ban advertising; it just makes it more
expensive. More expensive sounds good: A peace settlement in one theater of the
national War on Drugs could involve, among other things, (1) legalization of
marijuana, (2) retention of 280E’s financial burden on advertising, and (3)
imposition of whatever restrictions on advertising are Constitutionally permissible.”).
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control and those outside their control but acting on the entities they
seek to regulate.
II. REGULATORY OPTIONS WITHIN THE SPECTRUM OF
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR
ADVERTISING AND MARKETING
The Constitution’s free speech guarantee protects communications
137
from restrictions imposed by government actors. A government actor,
in turn, can justify restricting speech by showing that its purpose for
doing so is sufficiently important and its choice of the means of
138
restricting speech is adequately tailored to achieve it. The level of
protection for the speech, and the magnitude of the showing the
government must make to justify a speech restriction occupy different
locations on a spectrum depending upon the type of speech affected and
whether a regulation targets the speech directly or impacts it only
139
incidentally. The level of review that courts will apply to regulations of
marijuana-related speech, and the options available to regulators, will
vary according to where the regulated speech falls within this spectrum.
The discussion below first identifies the two endpoints of the spectrum.
On one side, speech is most highly protected from restrictions and on
the other side, government entities receive the greatest constitutional
latitude to take actions that may restrict speech. The discussion then
works inward to the permutations of regulations that impact advertising,
which falls into the constitutional category of “commercial speech,”
137

U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech.”); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (incorporating the Free
Speech Clause guarantee to apply against states and localities through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
138
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 118 (1991) (to justify a content-based statute, “the State must show that its
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end” (quoting Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231
(1987))); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)
(content-neutral time, place or manner regulations “are valid provided that they are
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of the information”); United
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (“[A] governmental regulation [of
expressive conduct] is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of
the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.”).
139
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (“Our
precedents . . . apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress,
disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content. . . .
In contrast, regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an
intermediate level of scrutiny because in most cases they pose a less substantial risk of
excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue” (citations omitted)).

LCB_21_4_Article_5_Jacobs (Do Not Delete)

1102

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

2/7/2018 7:25 PM

[Vol. 21:4

explaining the rules and identifying issues and options for state
regulators. Appendix A contains a graphic illustration of the Regulated
140
Speech Impact Spectrum.
A. The Two Extremes: Full Free Speech Protection and None At All
1. Fully Protected Speech
The federal Constitution protects speech on the subject of marijuana
141
as fully as it protects speech on other subjects. Less than full protection
142
attaches only when a speaker “propose[s] a commercial transaction” or
engages in “expression related solely to the economic interests of the
143
The line between this category of
speaker and its audience.”
144
“commercial speech” and fully protected speech is far from clear. At
140
An excellent recent article, Tamara Lange et al., Regulating Tobacco Product
Advertising and Promotions in the Retail Environment: A Roadmap for States and Localities,
43 J.L. & MED. ETHICS 878 (2015), provides advice to regulators, and sets out
applicable constitutional categories, in the context of tobacco advertising. It also
provides a summary of best practices and a table of legal standards applicable to
various types of government regulations. Both its substance and structure provided
very helpful guidance to me as I wrote this Article.
141
See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) (equating student’s advocacy
of drug use with speech filled with sexual innuendo, which if delivered “in a public
forum outside the school context” would have been fully protected, but finding, in
both instances, that the students’ speech rights were circumscribed by the “special
characteristics of the school environment”); Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S.
316, 325 (2002) (upholding content-neutral park permit scheme as applied to
speaker who wanted to hold a rally advocating legalization of marijuana, but noting
that had the city denied the permit because the speaker’s viewpoint was “disfavored,”
the denial “would of course be unconstitutional”).
142
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
143
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
561 (1980); Hunt v. City of Los Angeles, 638 F.3d 703, 715 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Where
the facts present a close question, ‘strong support’ that the speech should be
characterized as commercial speech is found where the speech is an advertisement,
the speech refers to a particular product, and the speaker has an economic
motivation.”) (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983));
see also Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the
Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67, 74–75 (2007) (The
definition of commercial speech for the Court is “speech advocating the sale of
commercial products or services.”).
144
Charles v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[I]n
many areas ‘the boundary between commercial and noncommercial speech has yet to
be clearly delineated.’”); Samuel A. Terilli, Nike v. Kasky and the Running-But-GoingNowhere Commercial Speech Debate, 10 COMM. L. & POL’Y 383, 386 (2005) (“[T]here
remains soft, uncertain ground and multipart balancing tests created by courts to
attempt to bring order to the inherently disordered nature of speech and commerce.
In this legal marshland, the commercial speech doctrine has become a linguistic
quagmire for speakers with commercial interests and for speech that may or may not
be deemed commercial.”). The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that
“ambiguities may exist at the margins of the category of commercial speech.”
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least, however, restrictions of speech relating to marijuana that are not
primarily directed from a seller to buyers for the purpose of promoting
sales are evaluated under the rules that apply to fully protected, rather
145
than commercial, speech.
Recent cases address speech restrictions that are clearly on the fullyprotected side of the line. One case involved one of the new marijuana
146
regulations enacted in Colorado after legalization. This rule required
that magazines whose “primary focus is marijuana or marijuana
businesses” be sold only from behind the counter in stores where persons
147
under twenty-one years old are present. After High-Times magazine
filed a lawsuit, and with the acquiescence of the state’s attorney general, a
federal court enjoined enforcement of the provision, reasoning that it
presented a blatant violation of the Constitution’s free speech
148
guarantee. In another case, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
held that Iowa State University could not prevent a marijuana law reform
advocacy group from distributing a t-shirt with the Iowa State University
149
mascot on one side and a marijuana leaf on the other. By allowing all
student groups to use the mascot subject only to ministerial approval
requirements, the school had created a limited public forum, which the
Constitution required that it administer without respect to the student
150
groups’ viewpoints.
Because speech that references marijuana or that is offered by
marijuana vendors may be subject to different levels of judicial
evaluation, a court must make the initial determination of whether the
regulated speech is fully protected or is advertising that falls into the
151
category of commercial speech before conducting its analysis of the
152
government’s purpose and the tailoring of its means to achieve it.

Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 765 (1993); see also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993) (recognizing “the difficulty of drawing bright
lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct category”); Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (stating that “the precise
bounds of the category of . . . commercial speech” are “subject to doubt, perhaps”).
145
See Trans-High Corp. v. Colorado, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1180 (D. Colo. 2013).
146
Id. at 1179.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
David Pitt, Iowa State University Loses Appeal in Marijuana T-Shirt Case, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Feb. 13, 2017), https://apnews.com/0e1af5be0b42472ca3ac7099cfadca20/IowaState-University-loses-appeal-in-marijuana-T-shirt-case.
150
Id.
151
The fact that speech is contained within an advertising communication is not
sufficient to classify it as commercial speech. Rather, courts must assess multiple
factors. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–68 (1983).
152
See Mercury Cas. Co. v. Jones, 214 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 327 (Ct. App. 2017)
(addressing the question “whether [the challenged code section] encompasses only
commercial speech or whether . . . it encompasses both commercial and
noncommercial speech” because “different levels of scrutiny are implicated
depending on whether commercial or noncommercial speech is involved.”); Kasky v.
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Regulators must be alert to this inquiry and narrow regulations of
marijuana communications to include only advertisements that are
properly classified as commercial speech.
2. No Speech Protection
Regulations of sales conduct that do not impact seller-to-consumer
153
communication do not receive Free Speech Clause protection. In the
marketing context, whether a particular sales practice is “expressive” and
thus protected by the free speech guarantee is a judicial determination
that hinges on whether the seller intends to communicate a message by
means of the conduct and whether an audience is likely to understand it
154
as a communication. Many aspects of marijuana sales transactions do
not even arguably send a communication. These include regulations of
the quality and potency of the products, the variety of products (liquid,
weed, edible), permissible product ingredients, the type and permissible
locations and hours of operation of retail vendors, retail licensing,
155
minimum purchasing ages, and maximum quantities of purchase.
None of the heightened levels of Free Speech Clause reviews apply to
156
these types of regulations. They are subject only to minimum due
157
process and equal protection rational basis review.
The line between expressive and non-expressive sales practices is

Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247 (2002) (addressing the “issue . . . whether defendant
corporation’s false statements are commercial or noncommercial speech for
purposes of constitutional free speech analysis under the state and federal
Constitutions” because “commercial speech receives a lesser degree of constitutional
protection than many other forms of expression, and because governments may
entirely prohibit commercial speech that is false or misleading” and leaving for
resolution by the lower court “whether any false representations were made”).
153
See Hightower v. City and Ct.y of San Francisco, 77 F. Supp. 3d 867, 880 (N.D.
Cal. 2014) (finding that multiple instances of public nudity prohibited by ordinance
were not communications, and therefore did not “constitute expressive conduct
protected by the First Amendment”).
154
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (Conduct is expressive
and protected by the First Amendment if “[a]n intent to convey a particularized
message was present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood [is] great
that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”).
155
INST. OF MED., LEGAL STRATEGIES IN CHILDHOOD OBESITY PREVENTION:
WORKSHOP SUMMARY 33 (2011) (“Regulations on the sale and advertising of foods can
be tailored in a variety of ways so as not to constitute unlawful restrictions on free
speech. . . . Increasing the price of a product, limiting per capita purchases, banning
or limiting harmful products or ingredients, and instituting age limits on the sale of a
product have all yielded benefits with other products and could be applied to
foods.”); Tamara Lange et al., Regulating Tobacco Product Advertising and Promotions in
the Retail Environment: A Roadmap for States and Localities, 43 J.L. & MED. ETHICS 878,
890 (2015) (“Non-speech interventions may include tobacco retailer licensing
schemes, reducing the number and density of tobacco outlet, raising the minimum
legal sales age to 21 years old, and banning tobacco sales in pharmacies or other
retail outlets.”).
156
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 470 (1997).
157
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).
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hazy at the intersection. Two recent federal court decisions upholding
local restrictions on price discounting practices by tobacco companies
158
help locate the boundary. In both cases, tobacco companies argued
that the ordinances restricted commercial speech because by
“prohibiting the sale and the offer to sell cigarettes and tobacco products
below the listed price, the ordinance[s] impermissibly restrict[]
plaintiffs’ ability to communicate discount pricing and deal information
to consumers” and “that they use coupons and discount offers to tell
their consumers that they are “getting a deal” if they purchase the
product at a particular price, to encourage them to purchase a particular
159
brand, or to make their purchase at a particular location.” Both courts
relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
160
involving alcohol price advertising. Although the Court
Island
invalidated the state’s price advertising ban, the Justices in various
opinions distinguished “alternative forms of regulation that would not
161
involve any restriction on speech,” such as “establishing minimum
162
163
prices” and limiting “per capita purchases.” Applying this reasoning,
both courts held that the ordinances before them “only regulate[d] an

158

[T]hese pricing practices often play out in the following manner:

1. § 17–176(b)(1). A consumer receives a coupon in the mail from the Lorillard
Tobacco Company offering $1 off of the listed price for a pack of Newport
cigarettes. The consumer may redeem the coupon at any store that sells Newport
cigarettes.
2. § 17–176(b)(2). A retailer provides a promotion whereby upon purchasing
two packs of Marlboro cigarettes, a consumer receives $2 off of the listed price
for purchasing a third pack of Marlboro cigarettes.
3. § 17–176(b)(3). In exchange for purchasing a pack of Camel cigarettes, a
retailer provides a consumer with a free, or discounted, lighter bearing the
Camel logo.
4. § 17–176(b)(4). A retailer provides a one-day sale where all American Spirit
cigarettes are sold at $1 off of the listed price; STATE AND CMTY. TOBACCO
CONTROL RESEARCH, REGULATING PRICE DISCOUNTING IN PROVIDENCE, RI 4
(2013).
Price discounting is a strategy employed by the tobacco industry to influence
tobacco purchasing and use among potential customers who would otherwise be
deterred by higher tobacco prices. Price discounting involves a number of tactics
that may be geared toward tobacco wholesalers, retailers, or directly to
consumers. Popular direct-to-consumer promotions include: cents or dollar-off
promotions, multi-pack discounts, and other price-related incentives such as buysome-get-some-free deals.

Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. City of New York, 27 F. Supp. 3d 415, 419
(S.D.N.Y. 2014).
159
Id. at 421 (“In National Association of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. City of
Providence, Rhode Island, 731 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2013), the First Circuit considered a
similar challenge to the one presently before this court.”).
160
44 Liquormart, Inc v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco
Outlets, 27 F. Supp. at 422; Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, 731 F.3d at 77.
161
44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 507.
162
Id. at 530 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
163
Id. at 507.
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economic transaction—the sale of tobacco products below the listed
price” and because they did not “restrict the dissemination of pricing
information,” the First Amendment’s free speech analysis did not
164
apply.
Additionally, and importantly, both courts rejected the tobacco
companies’ argument that the ordinances unconstitutionally restricted
commercial speech because they were prevented “from offering to sell
165
cigarettes and tobacco products below the listed price.” The courts
reasoned that a prerequisite to First Amendment protection for
commercial speech is that the speech offers to engage in a legal
166
transaction. Because the pricing restrictions contained within the
ordinances were lawful, “the offers that are restricted by the ordinance[s]
are offers to engage in an unlawful activity—namely, the sale of cigarettes
167
and tobacco products below the listed price.” Consequently, the offers
168
were not protected under the Constitution as commercial speech.
Both holdings that pricing practices are not speech and that
governments may restrict advertising of conduct that they have lawfully
prohibited are significant in the context of marijuana regulation. Pricing
practices are a key tool of manufacturers to stimulate demand generally
169
and among populations particularly vulnerable to adverse effects.
Advertisements for “five free joints to new customers,” and “a free pipe
packed with marijuana and a free week of yoga” found in a pull-out
supplement to a Colorado newspaper confirm that marijuana sellers will
employ these same types of price discounting techniques so long as they
170
are legal. Regulating these pricing techniques directly, rather than the
advertising of them, may accomplish public health objectives without
incurring the cost and risk of a constitutional challenge.

164
Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 423; Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets,
731 F.3d at 77.
165
Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 423.
166
Id. (“[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that the ‘government may ban
commercial speech related to illegal activity’” (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980))).
167
Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 423; see also Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco
Outlets, 731 F.3d at 78.
168
The Court’s recent decision in Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S.
Ct. 1144 (2017) confirms that regulations of pricing practices aimed at preventing
discounting restrict conduct, not speech. See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Memo to Cannabis
Regulators: The Expressions Hair Design Decision Does Not Limit Your Broad Authority to
Restrict All Forms of Discounting, 49 U. PAC. L. REV. 67 (2017).
169
TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, CIGARETTE MINIMUM PRICE LAWS
(2011); STATE AND CMTY. TOBACCO CONTROL RESEARCH, supra note 158, at 4.
170
Jeremy W. Peters, New Fuel for Local Papers: Medical Marijuana Ads, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/05/business/media/05pot.html?_
r=1&ref=todayspaper&pagewanted=all.
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B. The Middle Ground: Different Levels of Protection According to the Type of
Speech Impact
1. Commercial Speech Restrictions
a. The Category of Commercial Speech
Advertising through various types of media has been a critical
product marketing tool for centuries. But it was not until the mid-1970s
that the United States Supreme Court interpreted the First Amendment’s
171
free speech protection to extend to commercial messages. In Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the Court
invalidated a state law that prohibited advertising of prescription drug
172
prices. The Court condemned what it characterized as the “highly
paternalistic approach” adopted by the state of keeping truthful price
information from consumers based on the assumption that they will not
173
use it well. Instead, it interpreted the Constitution to require the
alternative assumption, which is “that this information is not in itself
harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are
well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the
174
channels of communication rather than to close them.” While it
acknowledged that advertising may seem “tasteless and excessive,” the
Court noted that it “is nonetheless dissemination of information” and the
“free flow of commercial information is indispensable” to promote
“intelligent and well informed” decision-making, which fulfills the public
interest in “the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system”
and “the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to
175
be regulated or altered.” Through this reasoning, the Court created the
jurisprudential category of commercial speech.
Although it interpreted the Constitution to protect commercial
speech, the Court also noted “commonsense differences” between it and
fully protected speech that “suggest that a different degree of protection
is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial
176
information is unimpaired.” Specifically, “the greater objectivity and
hardiness of commercial speech[] may make it less necessary to tolerate
inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker. . . . appropriate to
require that a commercial message appear in such a form, or include
such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary
to prevent its being deceptive,” and render “inapplicable the prohibition

171
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) (“The relationship of speech to
the marketplace of products or of services does not make it valueless in the
marketplace of ideas.”).
172
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
173
Id. at 770.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 765.
176
Id. at 771 n.24.
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against prior restraints.”
Over the last four decades, the Supreme Court and lower courts have
developed the boundaries of the category of commercial speech and the
analysis to determine the constitutionality of regulations applied to it.
Like other types of speech, the category of commercial speech includes
more than written or spoken words. Speech is a communication that may
178
179
180
occur through various means, including graphics, images, colors,
181
182
size,
other attention-drawing devices such as pop-up
sounds,
183
advertisements or lights, and likely more subtle, “embedded,” forms of
184
As noted above, the line between
product promotion as well.
185
commercial speech and fully protected speech is not bright.
Commercial speech is advertising, but a publication that is advertising
186
may contain communications that are fully protected speech. The
177

Id.
See, e.g., Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2239, 2242 (2015) (Confederate flag logo on proposed commemorative license
plate); Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 564–65 (6th
Cir. 2012) (graphics on a cigarette warning label).
179
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985)
(illustration of an intrauterine device in attorney advertisement); Saint John’s Church
in the Wilderness v. Scott, 296 P.3d 273, 283 (Colo. App. 2012) (images of mutilated
fetuses).
180
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510 (1969) (black
armband); Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 1459, 1462 (C.D. Cal.
1993) (colors and logos of sports teams adopted by gangs).
181
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (music).
182
See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2230 (2015) (ordinance
regulating size of temporary directional signs); Peterson v. Village of Downers Grove,
150 F. Supp. 3d 910, 929 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (ordinance restricting total area of signage).
183
Rebecca Tushnet, Attention Must Be Paid: Commercial Speech, User-Generated Ads,
and the Challenge of Regulation, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 721, 725 (2010) (“As we are exposed to
more and more, it becomes harder to get our attention, so promoters are forced to
further extremes. Advertising clutter drives marketers to put messages on fire
hydrants and potholes, on eggs, in urinals, on the bellies of pregnant women, and
anywhere else that might surprise us out of our willful disregard.”).
184
Rita Marie Cain, Embedded Advertising on Television: Disclosure, Deception and Free
Speech Rights, 30 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 226, 230 (2011) (“[T]he law is clearly unsettled
regarding undisclosed advertising and whether it is inherently deceptive or entitled
to free speech protection under the First Amendment.”).
185
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571 (2011) (finding that there was
“no need to determine whether all speech hampered by [the regulation] is
commercial” because the regulation was invalid under commercial speech analysis);
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 765 (1993) (“ambiguities may exist at the margins of
the category of commercial speech”); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,
507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993) (noting “the difficulty of drawing bright lines that will
clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct category”).
186
See Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989)
(discussing whether “pure speech and commercial speech [were] ‘inextricably
intertwined’” in a single communication); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463
U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (the mailing subject to regulations, which were conceded to be
advertisements, “must be examined carefully to ensure that speech deserving of
178

LCB_21_4_Article_5_Jacobs (Do Not Delete)

2017]

REGULATING MARIJUANA ADVERTISING

2/7/2018 7:25 PM

1109

California Supreme Court sifted through the Supreme Court’s decision
and identified three factors relevant to placing a communication into the
commercial speech category. These are a commercial speaker, intended
commercial audience, and representations of fact of a commercial
187
nature. This is only one articulation. Nevertheless, it provides general
guidance for most cases and captures the essence of the communications
that states may regulate subject to the judicial review that applies to
commercial speech.
b. Central Hudson Test
Defining the category of commercial speech is important so long as a
different and more deferential level of judicial review applies to
regulations of it. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service
188
Commission of N.Y., the Court borrowed from its intermediate-level test
for assessing content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations to
189
create a similar standard of review for commercial speech restrictions.
Under the Central Hudson test, courts were directed to assess the weight
of the government’s purpose and the degree of tailoring of the speechrestrictive means apparent in the regulation more deferentially than they
do when the government restricts fully protected speech based upon its
190
content.
For a number of years, Justice Thomas has advocated that the Court
apply to regulations of truthful commercial speech the same strict
191
scrutiny review it applies to restrictions of fully protected speech. The
greater constitutional protection is not inadvertently suppressed”).
187
See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (2002).
188
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
189
Id. at 566.
190
Id.; see infra (describing the four-part Central Hudson test).
191
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1769 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (writing separately because he “continue[s] to
believe that when the government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order to
suppress the ideas it conveys, strict scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech
in question may be characterized as ‘commercial’” (quoting Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 533 U. S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas., J., concurring)); see also 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522–23 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I do not
see a philosophical or historical basis for asserting that ‘commercial’ speech is of
‘lower value’ than ‘noncommercial’ speech” and “I do not join the principal
opinion’s application of the Central Hudson balancing test because I do not believe
that such a test should be applied to a restriction of ‘commercial’ speech, at least
when, as here, the asserted interest is one that is to be achieved through keeping
would-be recipients of the speech in the dark.”); Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott,
Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 504 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I continue to disagree with
the use of the Central Hudson balancing test and the discounted weight given to
commercial speech generally.”); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United
States, 527 U.S. 173, 197 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I continue to adhere to
my view that ‘[i]n cases such as this, in which the government’s asserted interest is to
keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices
in the marketplace,’ the Central Hudson test should not be applied because ‘such an

LCB_21_4_Article_5_Jacobs (Do Not Delete)

1110

2/7/2018 7:25 PM

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:4

192

Court has not adopted this position, but has tightened its application of
the Central Hudson test, invalidating all of the commercial speech
193
restrictions it has reviewed in the past twenty years. Two recent
opinions authored by Justice Kennedy and joined, in combination, by a
majority of the current Justices, state that an unspecified form of
194
“heightened scrutiny” applies to some subset of commercial speech
195
restrictions. Despite this movement, however, and despite continuing
196
requests that the Court explicitly abandon the Central Hudson test, the
Justices have not combined into a majoirty Court to do so. Because
Central Hudson remains the law, the Court’s recent applications of this
197
test provide the best guide for regulators when crafting new policies.
The Central Hudson test contains four prongs. The first prong is not a
part of the end/means balancing but is rather a prerequisite to First
198
Amendment protection. For commercial speech to receive free speech
“interest” is per se illegitimate and can no more justify regulation of “commercial
speech” than it can justify regulation of “noncommercial” speech’” (citation
omitted)).
192
Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1764 (declining to decide which test should apply to
trademark disparagement condition because it fails Central Hudson scrutiny); id. at
1767 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (applying “heightened scrutiny” because the
disparagement provision was viewpoint discriminatory); Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S.
at 554 (noting that “several Members of the Court have expressed doubts about the
Central Hudson analysis and whether it should apply in particular cases” but finding no
need to “break new ground”).
193
See Annotation 17-First Amendment, FIND LAW, http://constitution.findlaw.com/
amendment1/annotation17.html (“Recent decisions suggest, however, that [although]
further distinctions may exist[] [m]easures aimed at preserving ‘a fair bargaining
process’ between consumer and advertiser may be more likely to pass the test.”); C.
Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L.J. 981, 983 (2009)
(“As of 2007, . . . the trend [of the Court’s commercial speech protections] is
apparently toward being more protective.”).
194
Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1767–68 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (purporting to apply
“heightened scrutiny,” but finding that the means of excising disparaging content
“bears no plausible relation” to trademark law’s goal of “facilitat[ing] source
identification”).
195
See id. at 1767 (viewpoint discrimination apparent in a regulation of
commercial speech “necessarily invokes heightened scrutiny”); Sorrell v. IMS Health
Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 565 (2011) (Because the law at issue is “designed to impose a
specific, content-based burden on protected expression[, i]t follows that heightened
judicial scrutiny is warranted.”).
196
Brief Amicus Curiae of Pac. Legal Found. in Support of Respondent at 11, Lee
v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016) (No. 15-1293) (“This Court should quell any remaining
confusion by expressly overruling Central Hudson.”).
197
See Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2017) (en
banc) (reviewing the Court’s jurisprudence and noting that in commercial speech
cases, it was joined by the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits in the
conclusion that the Central Hudson test continues to apply and that other circuits have
refused to decide the issue or addressed it outside the context of commercial
speech).
198
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980) (“At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by
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protection, it must (1) “concern lawful activity and not be misleading.”
The other inquiries are: (2) whether the asserted governmental interest
is substantial, (3) whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and (4) whether the regulation is “not
200
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” The first prong
creates substantial leeway for regulators to restrict marijuana advertising
and marketing practices to promote public health, so long as they act
thoughtfully and with foresight. The second prong will not be difficult
for regulators to meet, since they may have a number of legitimate and
substantial reasons to limit consumption of marijuana products. Clear
and precise vision with respect to the prong-two purpose for imposing a
commercial speech restriction is critical, however, because the prong
three and four tailoring determinations hinge upon the “fit” between the
purpose and the means of restricting speech. The prong three and four
determinations will be the most difficult for regulators to meet, so they
must act carefully and with regard to evidence in crafting advertising
restrictions to meet particular purposes.
i. Prerequisites to Federal Constitution Protection: Speech
Concerns Lawful Activity and is Not Misleading
The first prong of the Central Hudson test is particularly important to
regulators, both because of the legitimate bases for speech restrictions
that it contains, and because it is likely to survive even if the Court
“overrules” application of the Central Hudson test to some subset of
201
commercial speech regulations. Even as the Court has ratcheted up the
review of advertising regulations, it has continued to emphasize that the
constitutional protection accorded to commercial speech hinges on its
202
link to lawful commercial transactions and its value in informing
203
And, even as the Court has suggested that
consumers’ choices.
the First Amendment.”).
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Even Justice Thomas, who has advocated consistently for raising the level of
scrutiny for restrictions of commercial speech, would limit the scope of constitutional
protection to truthful speech that promotes transactions that are lawful. Greater New
Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 197, 197 (1999) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment) (government does not have a legitimate interest in keeping
“legal users of a product or service ignorant”); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533
U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (strict scrutiny is appropriate “when the government seeks to restrict
truthful speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys”).
202
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011) (“[T]he First Amendment
does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or conduct from imposing
incidental burdens on speech. That is why a ban on race-based hiring may require
employers to remove ‘White Applicants Only’ signs.”) (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Acad. Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006)).
203
Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 566 (“A ‘consumer’s concern for the free flow of
commercial speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent political
dialogue.’ . . . That reality has great relevance in the fields of medicine and public
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commercial speech and noncommercial speech are the same in some
respects, the Court has continued to recognize that commercial speech is
different in that governments have greater ability to determine the truth
or falsity of commercial speech and regulate it to prevent consumers
204
from being deceived or misled. So each of the requirements contained
within Central Hudson’s first prong—that the proposed transaction is
lawful and that the communication is not misleading—provide
significant and durable leeway for states to regulate potentially harmful
products to promote public health.
The background to any state regulation of marijuana is federal law,
under which it is “a felony for any person to place in any newspaper,
magazine, handbill, or other publications, any written advertisement
knowing that it has the purpose of seeking or offering illegally to receive,
buy, or distribute a Schedule I controlled substance, which includes
205
marijuana.” Federal prosecutors have in the recent past targeted media
206
outlets that publish marijuana advertisements, and the U.S. Postal
207
Service refuses to handle publications with marijuana advertisements.
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office refuses to register marijuana
208
product trademarks. So long as marijuana remains illegal federally,
state and local regulations will apply to the types of advertisements and
venues hardy enough to exist despite the threat of federal criminal
209
prosecution.
health, where information can save lives.” (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350, 364 (1977))).
204
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993) (“the State may ban commercial
expression that is fraudulent or deceptive without further justification”); Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985) (“The States and the Federal
Government are free to prevent the dissemination of commercial speech that is false,
deceptive, or misleading . . . .”); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69
(1983) (“The State may deal effectively with false, deceptive, or misleading sales
techniques.”); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (commercial speech that is false
or misleading is not entitled to First Amendment protection and “may be prohibited
entirely”); Bates, 433 U.S. at 383 (“[T]he leeway for untruthful or misleading
expression that has been allowed in other contexts has little force in the commercial
arena.”).
205
Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, U.S. Postal Service to Newspapers: Your Marijuana Ads Are
Illegal, FOX NEWS (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/12/04/u-spostal-service-to-newspapers-your-marijuana-ads-are-illegal.html.
206
Michael Montgomery, Feds to Target Newspapers, Radio for Pot Ads, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRIB. (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/watchdog/
sdut-feds-target-newspapers-radio-marijuana-ads-2011oct12-htmlstory.html.
207

Vlahos, supra note 205.
Hilary Bricken, Protect Your Cannabis Brand with a Trademark, CANNA LAW BLOG
(May 1, 2013), http://www.cannalawblog.com/protect-your-cannabis-brand-with-atrademark/.
209
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 772 (1976) (noting that “commercial speech may be more durable than other
kinds” and that “[s]ince advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is
little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely”
(footnote omitted)).
208
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With respect to state law, as noted above, the requirement that
protected commercial speech propose a lawful transaction means that
states may prohibit advertising of a product that is illegal entirely, or of
features of the product or the method of offering it for sale that are
unlawful when the sale of the product is not entirely illegal. With respect
to marijuana, states that have legalized marijuana for medical use have
210
already experienced partial legality. In those states, advertising is
protected so long as it is proposing the sale of marijuana for the medical
211
uses that make it legal. In states that legalize the sale of marijuana for
212
recreational uses, the protection for offers of sale extends to those uses.
Nevertheless, free speech protection will not extend to types of marijuana
213
214
products or marketing practices if the State has made them unlawful.
So, if a state were to limit single retail purchases to small amounts,
advertising offers of bulk sales would not be protected. Similarly, if a state
were to prohibit sales of marijuana of certain potencies, impose an age
limit for purchase, or prohibit price discounting practices such as
coupons or two-for-one offers, its power to prohibit advertising offers of
sale of the product with these features, to the prohibited audience, or
including unlawful discounting tactics would follow the illegality of the
conduct itself.
Regulators should always keep this potent linkage between their
power to prohibit conduct surrounding the sale of marijuana products
and the power to limit advertising without Free Speech Clause restraint
and strongly consider restricting product varieties and methods of sale
that are likely to lead to public health harms. If states allow dangerous
varieties of the product to be sold, or allow marketing practices that
encourage consumers to abuse the product, and then seek to impose
advertising restrictions to limit those effects, they will face tight
constitutional restraints and have difficulty justifying why they must use
these means of prohibiting speech to achieve their public health
objectives rather than prohibit the product feature or marketing practice
directly.

210

Peters, supra note 170.
Medical Marijuana Program Advertising Guide, CONN. DEP’T OF CONSUMER PROT.
2 (May 12, 2016), http://www.ct.gov/dcp/lib/dcp/drug_control/mmp/pdf/medical_
marijuana_advertising_guide.pdf (prohibiting advertisements that “contain statements,
designs, representations, pictures, or illustrations that encourage or represent the use
of marijuana for a condition other than a debilitating medical condition”).
212
Endejan, supra note122, at 1, 16.
213
John Ingold, New Study Reveals What Makes Marijuana Edibles Most Attractive to
Young Kids, DENVER POST (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/09/08/
marijuana-edibles-attractive-kids/ (Colorado forbids edible marijuana candy to be in
animal or fruit shapes).
214
Brendan Saloner et al., Policy Strategies to Reduce Youth Recreational Marijuana
Use, 135 PEDIATRICS 955, 956–57 (2015) (recommending that states require that
marijuana edibles be sold in child-proof packaging).
211
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Federal and state laws prohibit false or misleading advertising.
Agencies exist at the federal and state levels to enforce these laws, and
216
many laws also provide for private actions. Federal and state laws also
prohibit various methods of unfair competition, and federal law protects
217
trademarks against infringement. Marijuana sellers must comply with
these generally applicable laws, which make certain types of speech
218
unlawful. Although the illegality of marijuana federally means that
marijuana sellers cannot use federal law as a shield, vendors of lawful
products may use them as a sword to stop marijuana-product marketing
practices. For example, companies that branded their marijuana
products with names and packaging confusingly similar to Hershey’s
219
candy bars have already faced lawsuits.
With respect to advertising, while the truth or falsity of a claim can
220
be verified, whether a particular claim is misleading is less clear.
Agencies may receive substantial discretion to make these judgments
221
when implementing statutory mandates. When reviewing particular
applications, the Court has distinguished circumstances in which an
advertisement is misleading on its face, in which case it is not protected
by the free speech guarantee, from those in which an advertisement has a
tendency or capacity to mislead, in which case the Central Hudson analysis
215
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) (“Unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.”); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West
2017) (defining unfair competition as, among other things, any unfair, deceptive,
untrue or misleading advertising); id. at § 17500 (prohibiting false and misleading
advertising); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770 (West 2017) (listing a number of deceptive acts
that are deemed to be unlawful, including, but not limited to, advertising goods or
services with the intent not to sell them as advertised and knowingly making untrue
or misleading statements in advertisements). See generally Checklist of Significant
California and Federal Consumer Laws, CAL. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS (July 2012),
http://www.dca.ca.gov/publications/legal_guides/m-1.shtml.
216
Division of Advertising Practices, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/

about-ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-consumer-protection/our-divisions/division-advertisingpractices (describing the Federal Trade Commission, Division of Advertising

Practices); About the Office of the Attorney General, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL, https://oag.ca.gov/office; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West
2017) (authorizing public prosecution and private actions for false advertising).
217
15 U.S.C § 1114.
218
U.S. CONST. VI, cl. 2.
219
Alison Malsbury, Pot Parody: Not So Funny After All, CANNA LAW BLOG (Apr. 23,
2015), http://www.cannalawblog.com/pot-parody-not-so-funny-after-all/ (names
included “Mr. Dankbar,” “Reefer’s Peanut Butter Cups,” “Hasheath,” and “Ganja
Joy”).
220
Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of “False” Is: Falsity and
Misleadingness in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 227, 227–28 (2007).
221
POM Wonderful, LLC v. FTC, 777 F.3d 478, 492, 499–500 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(Federal Trade Commission’s finding that a truthful advertisement nonetheless
implies a misleading message to a minority of consumers, and therefore receives no
First Amendment protection, is subject to substantial-evidence rather than de novo
review).
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222

applies. When addressing newly-legalized marijuana, regulators should
consider the background environment of false or deceptive
advertisement restrictions and remedies and consider the need and
justification for marijuana-specific false or deceptive advertising
restrictions. If they seek to restrict marijuana marketing practices
particularly, on this ground, regulators should collect evidence to
support their decision that particular claims or practices are false or
223
deceptive.
ii. Substantial Government Interest
Central Hudson’s prong two asks only whether the government has a
substantial or important reason to take some type of action, leaving the
questions related to the means of restricting constitutionally protected
speech to prongs three and four. Because the focus of prong two is
exclusively on the importance of the government’s purpose in the
instance of marijuana advertising regulations, this prong will not be
difficult for regulators to meet. Marijuana remains illegal federally and in
the majority of states for a reason. Marijuana use creates adverse public
health effects, and states and localities that have legalized marijuana
maintain an interest in reducing those adverse effects, which courts will
224
deem to be substantial. Regulators may also have legitimate and
substantial interests that are market-based, such as providing full
information to consumers about the qualities of marijuana products or
promoting competition and consumer choice by preventing a few major
225
marijuana distributors from dominating the retail market.
Governments may have other substantial objectives for regulating the
many aspects of marijuana production and sale, including advertising.
Reducing demand for a lawful product for the purpose of promoting
public health is a substantial government purpose. Nevertheless,
222
Mass. Ass’n of Private Career Schs. v. Healey, 159 F. Supp. 3d 173, 203 (D.
Mass. 2016).
223
Five Tricky Ad Trends to Watch in 2015, TRUTH IN ADVERT. (Jan. 5, 2015),
https://www.truthinadvertising.org/five-tricky-ad-trends-watch-2015
(Washington
advertising rules prohibit advertisements from representing that “the use of
marijuana has curative or therapeutic effects”); Sean O’Connor & Sam Mendez,
WASH. UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, CONCERNING CANNABIS-INFUSED EDIBLES: FACTORS
THAT ATTRACT CHILDREN TO FOODS (June 28, 2016), http://lcb.wa.gov/

publications/Marijuana/Concerning-MJ-Infused-Edibles-Factors-That-Attract-Children.pdf

(reporting findings on product qualities and marketing techniques that impact
children’s choices).
224
Marijuana and Public Health, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Jan.
26, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/marijuana/health-effects.htm.
225
See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 466 (2005) (maintaining a “three-tier
distribution scheme” [for alcohol] is a legitimate governmental interest); Capital
Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 715 (1984) (noting that “exercising control
over . . . how to structure the liquor distribution system” is a legitimate government
purpose); Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Appelsmith, 810 F.3d 638, 652 (9th Cir.
2016) (“[T]he State’s goal of suppressing a particular commercial structure, rather
than a particular commercial message, remains valid.”).
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reducing demand by means of restricting protected commercial speech is
fraught with constitutional danger. Although prongs three and four
address the means of restricting speech, and are the point at which
advertising restrictions aimed at reducing demand will fail, regulators
must be aware of the limits of restricting advertising to reduce demand
before they choose to do so. The Court has emphasized repeatedly that
regulators may not suppress advertising of a product to an audience that
226
may lawfully acquire it because the protected speech is “too persuasive.”
Regulators may not rest their decisions to restrict truthful advertising “on
the offensive assumption that the public will respond ‘irrationally’ to the
227
truth” or “keep people in the dark for what the government perceives
228
to be their own good.” Government regulators may not “prevent[] the
dissemination of truthful commercial information in order to prevent
members of the public from making bad decisions with the
229
even when the demand-increasing effect of
information”
230
advertisement and the public health dangers of overuse or misuse of
231
the product are acknowledged and indisputable. Such an approach is
232
“highly paternalistic” and will not survive review under Central Hudson
prongs three or four, or both.
To avoid these problems, regulators must identify whether one of
their purposes for restricting marijuana advertising is to reduce demand
and, if so, frame it in a way that can pass Central Hudson review or
abandon it as a viable justification for restricting speech. Restricting
advertising to prevent adults from being persuaded to make lawful
marijuana purchases because overuse or misuse of the product generally
leads to adverse public health consequences will not pass Central Hudson
review. Attempts to narrow the purpose to promoting “responsible drug
use” or “temperance” are unlikely to be successful because, even if courts
accept the purpose as substantial, regulators will have difficulty meeting
233
prongs three and four.
226

Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 577–78 (2011).
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (quoting
Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96 (1977)).
228
44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 503.
229
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002).
230
Henry Saffer, Alcohol Advertising and Youth, 14 J. STUDIES ON ALCOHOL 173
(2002) (twenty-country study concludes that alcohol advertising bans reduce
consumption); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 557–58 (2001)
(accepting the commonsense linkage between advertising and increased underage
demand for cigarettes).
231
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995) (beer); 44 Liquormart,
Inc., 517 U.S. at 510 (alcohol); Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 570 (tobacco).
232
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976).
233
Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 849 n.12 (9th Cir. 2017)
(en banc) (assuming that promoting temperance is a substantial interest but finding
the means of prohibiting advertising did not directly advance it); Mo. Broad. Ass’n. v.
Lacy, 846 F.3d 295, 301–02 (8th Cir. 2017) (finding that “the common sense link
227
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As noted above, states have much more leeway to restrict advertising
to prevent consumers from being persuaded to enter illegal marijuana
transactions. The ability of regulators to restrict advertising to reduce
demand thus hinges on the extent to which they have carved out a realm
of marijuana purchases that remain unlawful. States may restrict
advertising of product varieties and pricing practices that they have made
234
illegal. When states prohibit certain identifiable features or pricing
practices, they can tailor restrictions to prevent only transactions that are
illegal and thereby avoid the other steps in the Central Hudson analysis.
States may also restrict advertising to consumers who may not legally
purchase the product. With respect to marijuana, the most obvious and
likely limit that states may and should impose is an age requirement for
235
purchase and use. Reducing underage use of products with minimum236
age purchase requirements is a significant government purpose. States
may restrict advertising for the purpose of preventing an underage
audience that may not legally purchase the product from being
persuaded to do so and may restrict marketing practices with expressive
elements, such as display and placement, to limit underage access to the
237
product itself. Crafting regulations to serve the purpose of reducing
demand by one segment of an audience when other segments retain a
constitutional right to receive the information is more difficult than
creating a regulation that prohibits advertising a product with qualities
that cannot be sold to anyone, because the regulation that impacts a
238
mixed audience must pass Central Hudson review.
iii. Means Directly Advance the Purpose
The second prong of the Central Hudson test identifies the
government’s purposes for restricting speech that a court will accept as
substantial. Through the prong three and four inquiries, the government
must show that its choice of means—restricting protected speech—is

between advertising promotions and increasing demand for alcohol does not
demonstrate the challenged restrictions directly advance the interest in promoting
responsible drinking” because “[a] theoretical increase in demand for alcohol based
on a lower price does not necessarily mean any consumption of that alcohol is
irresponsible” and, as to the specific regulations, finding “[t]he multiple
inconsistencies within the regulations poke obvious holes in any potential
advancement of the interest in promoting responsible drinking, to the point the
regulations do not advance the interest at all”).
234
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 475B.025(2)(f) (2017).
235
See, e.g., id. at § 475B.260(1)(a).
236
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U. S. at 570.
237
Id. at 571 (“To the extent that federal law and the First Amendment do not
prohibit state action, States and localities remain free to combat the problem of
underage tobacco use by appropriate means.”).
238
Mo. Broad. Ass’n v. Lacy, 846 F.3d 295, 300–01 n.6 (8th Cir. 2017) (accepting
state’s purpose to promote “responsible” drinking as substantial but finding that the
regulations were not tailored to reduce excessive drinking specifically).
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appropriate and necessary to achieve its substantial purposes. Where
the government asserts more than one purpose for regulating, a court
240
will assess the end/means fit with respect to each purpose separately.
As noted above, the strongest and most certainly substantial basis for a
state to restrict advertising is the purpose of preventing underage
marijuana use. The Court has evaluated tobacco advertising restrictions
imposed for this purpose under the Central Hudson test, and its
application of prongs three and four, as well as the applications by lower
courts reviewing alcohol and tobacco advertising restriction aimed at
preventing underage use, provide important guidance for marijuana
241
advertising regulators. This Section will discuss analysis of regulations
aimed at reducing underage use as an example that regulators can apply
more generally when crafting regulations to “directly advance” other
substantial purposes.
Prong three requires that an advertising restriction “directly
242
advance” the government’s substantial purpose. This prong requires
proof of two things: first, that “the harms [the government] recites are
real” and second, “that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a
243
material degree.” The first showing follows from the government’s
substantial purpose established in prong two. So, when a government
asserts a purpose to prevent underage marijuana use, prong three
requires that it show with evidence, rather than “speculation and
244
conjecture,” that the danger that minors will use marijuana exists. Note
that the prong three showing is not that the product is dangerous for
245
minors, but rather that minors will use marijuana even though it is
unlawful for them. Regulators will have little difficulty making this
246
showing.

239

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
564 (1980).
240
Id.
241
See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. City of New York, 27 F. Supp.
3d 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
242
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 477 U.S. at 564.
243
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 197, 198
(1999) (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993)).
244
Id.
245
States need not present evidence to show this because they have the power to
make use of the product by minors illegal subject only to minimum rational basis
scrutiny. Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 423 (“[T]he Supreme Court
has made clear that the government may ban commercial speech related to illegal
activity.” (citation omitted)).
246
Monitoring the Future Survey: High School and Youth Trends, NAT’L INST. OF
HEALTH (2016), https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/monitoringfuture-survey-high-school-youth-trends (presenting statistics on teen drug use and
concluding that use is higher among 12th graders in states that have legalized
marijuana); ROCKY MOUNTAIN HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA, The
Legalization
of
Marijuana
in
Colorado,
The
Impact
37
(2015),
http://www.rmhidta.org/html/2015%20PREVIEW
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The second part of the prong three showing is that the means
chosen by the state—restricting speech—will be effective in reducing the
247
harm that it has shown to exist. This causation showing can be
challenging for regulators to present effectively. It generally should not
be difficult to show that advertising increases demand for products,
248
including marijuana. Although the prong is stated as forward-looking,
in fact governments seeking to regulate a newly legal product like
marijuana can only present evidence from the past and from analogous
products to show this cause-and-effect relationship between advertising
and youth demand. The Court has acknowledged generally “the theory
that product advertising stimulates demand for products, while
249
suppressed advertising may have the opposite effect.” Studies exist
250
251
252
relating to alcohol, tobacco, and e-cigarettes linking advertising to
253
increased use by teens, and since the legalization of marijuana for
medical use in some states, such studies linking advertising of marijuana
254
to increased use by teens exist as well.
The more difficult part of the “direct advancement” showing is that
the particular restrictions are targeted to reduce the particular problem
255
of underage use which justifies them, and that the entire scheme of
%20Legalization%20of%20MJ%20in%20Colorado%20the%20Impact.pdf.
247
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. at 188.
248
Regulators have had difficulty showing that warnings reduce demand. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (government
failed to show “direct advance[ment]” when their own study showed that warnings
only reduced demand by “a mere 0.088%”).
249
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 557 (2001); Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S.
418, 434 (1993); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 568–69 (1980).
250
Saffer, supra note 230, at 173.
251
Lois Biener & Michael Siegel, Tobacco Marketing and Adolescent Smoking: More
Support for a Causal Inference, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 407 (2000).
252
Matt Wotus, Advertisements Seem to Be Driving the Demand for E-Cigarettes Among
Teenagers, GENERATION PROGRESS (Mar. 22, 2016), http://genprogress.org/voices/
2016/03/22/42762/advertisements-seem-to-be-driving-the-demand-for-e-cigarettesamong-teenagers/.
253
Victor C. Strasburger, Policy Statement–Children, Adolescence, Substance Abuse, and
the Media, 126 PEDIATRICS 791, 792 (2010) (“The power of advertising to influence
children and adolescents (and adults, for that matter) is incontrovertible. Advertising
works; otherwise, companies would not spend billions of dollars on it. Many ads use
celebrity endorsers, humor, rock music, or attractive young models, all of which have
been shown to be effective with children and adolescents. Advertising makes smoking
and drinking seem like normative activities and may function as a ‘superpeer’ in
subtly pressuring teenagers to experiment. Research has revealed that advertising
may be responsible for up to 30% of adolescent tobacco and alcohol use.”).
254
Elizabeth J. D’Amico, Adolescents Who View Medical Marijuana Advertising Are
More Likely to Use the Drug, RAND CORP. (July 6, 2015), http://www.rand.org/
news/press/2015/07/06.html.
255
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561 (2001) (state had
demonstrated direct advancement by “preventing targeted campaigns and limiting

LCB_21_4_Article_5_Jacobs (Do Not Delete)

1120

2/7/2018 7:25 PM

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:4
256

advertising restrictions is consistent with purpose. Regulators must
present evidence or be able to support by common sense that the
advertisements they restrict are likely to be seen by minors. Advertisers
are highly sensitive to the content of their audience, so data about the
likely percentages of underage viewers likely will exist. Nevertheless,
regulators should anticipate challenges and support every restriction by
demonstrating the link to youth viewing on its face or with background
evidence.
Regulators must also be certain that their scheme of regulations
consistently seeks to minimize the harm of youth marijuana use. That is,
they should be prepared to address the questions of “under-inclusion”
familiar from the constitutional ends/means tailoring tests more rigorous
257
than rational basis scrutiny. With respect to marijuana advertising
restrictions, the scheme should show that the government is restricting
types of advertisements that present the same type of harm in the same
258
way. The Court has applied this requirement strictly, rejecting a law
that required retail tobacco advertisements to be posted higher than five
feet, reasoning that children below that height could look up and view
259
the signs.
iv. Means No Greater Than Necessary to Advance Purpose
(Tailoring)
The fourth prong of the Central Hudson test requires a showing that
meets the second, “over-inclusion” side of the familiar inquiry into
whether the chosen means—restricting protected speech—is sufficiently
260
tailored to achieve the government’s purpose. While in prong three,
regulators show that restricting advertisements is necessary to achieve
their purpose, this prong requires them to show that they are not
youth exposure to advertising”); Mo. Broad. Ass’n v. Lacy, 846 F.3d 295, 301 (8th Cir.
2017) (“[T]he common sense link between advertising promotions and increasing
demand for alcohol does not demonstrate the challenged restrictions directly
advance the interest in promoting responsible drinking. A theoretical increase in
demand for alcohol based on a lower price does not necessarily mean any
consumption of that alcohol is irresponsible.”).
256
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 88–89 (1995) (finding entire
scheme of advertising regulations to undercut state’s interest in reducing demand).
257
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (under
minimal economic regulation review regulators can take “one step at a time” rather
than address all sources of the same harm in the same way).
258
Rubin, 514 U.S. at 488–89 (finding that a state law that prohibited beer labels
from displaying alcohol content did not directly advance the purpose of preventing
“strength wars” because it did not prohibit such information in beer advertising, or
on labels of higher-content types of alcohol); see also Mo. Broad. Ass’n, 846 F.3d at 301
(“The multiple inconsistences within the regulations poke obvious holes in any
potential advancement of the interest in promoting responsible drinking, to the
point the regulations do not advance the interest at all.”).
259
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 566.
260
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 197, 188
(1999).
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restricting a significant amount of speech that they do not need to
261
restrict to achieve their end. This prong also requires regulators to
demonstrate that they are using the least restrictive means of restricting
262
Again, the
speech rather than some alternate regulatory device.
example of regulations aimed at restricting underage use of marijuana is
helpful to understand the difficulties in tailoring regulations more
generally.
In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, the Court found that a number of
advertising restrictions within 1,000 feet of locations that children and
teens frequent such as schools, parks and playgrounds failed the prong
263
four inquiry. The Court found the 1,000-foot rule to be too blunt in a
number of respects. With respect to distance, it faulted the State for
failing to demonstrate how much speech would be restricted in major
264
metropolitan areas and how the rule would apply outside cites. With
respect to the restricted media, the Court determined that the State
should have tailored the restrictions more carefully to target “particular
advertising and promotion practices that appeal to youth” and “highly
265
visible billboards, as opposed to smaller signs.” It also found the fivefoot sign rule to be too broad, noting that the rule could have been more
narrowly tailored to restrict only advertisements visible at the range that
266
particularly “entice children.”
The requirement that regulators show that they chose the least
speech-restrictive policy can be very hard to meet. Although the Court
has said that this requirement is not as severe as the “no alternate means”
showing in strict scrutiny, it has frequently listed alternatives that are
267
Regulators must carefully
more difficult or costly for regulators.
consider the availability and relative efficacy of regulatory alternatives
that are less speech-restrictive than advertising restrictions, and
document their lesser efficacy or the prohibitive cost of implementing
them to support their prong four showing. If evidence specific to
marijuana does not yet exist, regulators should collect evidence that
relates to other health-hazard products to support their logical inferences
with respect to marijuana.

261
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371 (2002) (“[I]f the
Government could achieve its interests in a manner that does not restrict speech, or
that restricts less speech, the Government must do so.”).
262
Id. at 373 (“If the First Amendment means anything, it means that regulating
speech must be a last—not first—resort.”).
263
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 566.
264
Id. at 562–63.
265
Id. at 563.
266
Id. at 566.
267
See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 (1996) (listing the
alternatives of taxes, direct product regulations and spending tax money to engage in
educational campaigns to reduce excess consumption).
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2. Expressive Sales Practices
Most sales practices involve conduct that is not necessarily attached
to an advertising communication and so states may regulate these
268
practices without passing any type of free speech scrutiny. The subset of
sales practices that form a part of an advertising communication must
269
pass some type of free speech scrutiny. These practices contribute to
the persuasive effect of the communication and include the many devices
that advertisers use to catch the attention of consumers, such as size,
colors, lights, graphics, pop-ups and danglers, location within a city,
location within a store or on a shelf, and whether access to the product is
270
open or unobstructed.
The level of review of these types of practices depends upon the
government’s reason for restricting them, specifically its theory of how
the sales practice undermines the public purpose that justifies the
regulation. If the government restricts the sales practice because its
message influences consumer behavior, which in turn undermines the
271
public purpose, then Central Hudson analysis applies. If the government
restricts the sales practice because some aspect of it other than the
message influences behavior, which undermines the public purpose,
then the lower level expressive conduct test articulated in United States v.
272
O’Brien applies. In either of these instances, the government’s ultimate
purpose for regulating the sales practice may be the same. It is the
government’s theory of the linkage between the sales practice and the
public harm that determines the level of scrutiny.
The example of point-of-sale regulations illustrates the distinction.
Regulators may impose a number of restrictions on sales practices within
retail stores for the purpose of reducing underage marijuana use. One
strategy is to require that marijuana products be sold behind the counter
or behind locked cabinets, rather than in open shelves or bins accessible
to consumers. This rule impacts a sales practice that is part of the
persuasive force of the advertising communication, but because the
government’s reason for regulating the practice is to prevent underage
access to the product rather than underage persuasion by the message,
273
the O’Brien expressive conduct analysis would apply. By contrast, if a
state were to prohibit “power walls” of marijuana displays behind the
274
counter, such as frequently exist for tobacco and alcohol, it could not
268

Cain, supra note 184, at 231.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
564 (1980).
270
Lange et al., supra note 155, at 880.
271
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 477 U.S. at 564.
272
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
273
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 567 (2001) (applying O’Brien
scrutiny to a ban on self-service cigarette displays, but noting that an accessible display
that contained empty packages could fulfill the seller’s speech interests).
274
Lange et al., supra note 155, at 889–90 (“Many stores feature ‘power walls’ of
tobacco products, which are large and highly visible shelving units featuring
269
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claim that its reason for restricting the practice was to limit physical
access. Instead, its theory of the linkage between the practice and
underage behavior would have to be that the message sent by the
overwhelming displays persuades minors to use a product that is
unhealthy for them. Thus, the power wall regulation would need to
survive “heightened” Central Hudson scrutiny.
The sales practice distinctions are not obvious, but because the levels
of scrutiny vary significantly, it is crucial for regulators to master and
apply them prior to crafting regulations. Not only must a regulator
identify the ultimate public purpose for restricting an expressive sales
practice, but it must also identify carefully the behavior it wants to avoid
in order to fulfill its purpose and how the restricted sales practice
provokes it. No matter which type of scrutiny applies, a court will analyze
the fit between the purpose and the means of restricting a sales practice
that is a part of speech. Consequently, regulators should always take care
to support their decisions to regulate expressive sales practice with
evidence of the harms they provoke, and tailor the restrictions so a court
can understand, by looking at the scope of the regulation, how the
restriction reduces behaviors provoked by the practice that lead to public
harms.
3. Disclosures and Warnings
Governments at all levels mandate that sellers disclose certain
275
information to consumers. In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of
276
Sup. Ct. of Ohio, decided soon after Central Hudson, the Court rejected
the argument that “precisely the same inquiry as determining the validity
of the restrictions on advertising content” should apply to determine the
277
because “material
constitutionality of disclosure requirements
cigarettes, cigars, e-cigarettes, smokeless tobacco and other tobacco products. Many
displays are six or seven feet tall, and they feature not only the product, but ‘danglers’
and ‘bursts’ which are small signs designed to draw attention to product pricing and
promotions.”).
275
Entities imposing disclosure requirements include Congress, see, for example,
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2012); federal
agencies, see, for example, 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.1–101.95 (2016) (Food and Drug
Administration regulations imposing Food for Human Consumption Labeling
Standards); 27 C.F.R. §§ 4.1–4.5 (2016) (Department of the Treasury, Alcohol and
Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, imposing labeling requirements for wine); 16 C.F.R.
§§ 1201.1–1420.1 (2016) (Consumer Product Safety Commission product labeling
standards); state legislatures, see, for example, CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST,
THE
FOOD
SAFETY
NET
i–xvii
(2006),
SHREDDING
http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/shredding.pdf (reviewing state food safety and
labeling laws that proposed action in Congress would preempt); state agencies, see,
for example, CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 32912–21 (West 2001) (milk product
labeling); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 19080–93 (West 2008) (home furnishings
labeling); and city councils and agencies, see, for example, S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE
art. 8, § 468.3 (2010) (menu labeling at chain restaurants).
276
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
277
Id. at 650.
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differences [exist] between disclosure requirements and outright
278
prohibitions on speech.” The Court reasoned that “[b]ecause the
extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is
justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such
speech provides, . . . [a seller’s] constitutionally protected interest in not
providing any particular factual information in his advertising is
minimal” and that “because disclosure requirements trench much more
narrowly on an advertiser’s interests than do flat prohibitions on speech,
“warning[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required . . . in
279
order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception.”
While it noted that “unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure
requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected
280
commercial speech,” it held that “an advertiser’s rights are adequately
protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to
281
the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”
As noted above, the Court has tightened review of speech restrictions
282
in the decades since its decisions in Central Hudson and Zauderer.
Corporate speakers have challenged government-imposed disclosure
requirements over and over again, arguing that commercial speech
disclosure requirements should be reviewed under the same, rising
283
standard as commercial speech restraints. Fairly recently, the Court
confirmed that the Zauderer lower level review applies at least when the
government imposes a disclosure requirement to prevent consumers
284
Some lower courts interpret
from being confused or deceived.
278

Id.
Id. at 651.
280
Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 282–83 (3d Cir. 2014) (a disclosure is unduly
burdensome when it is “so lengthy that it ‘effectively rules out’ advertising by the
desired means”).
281
Id. at 282.
282
See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting “the
flux and uncertainty of the First Amendment doctrine of commercial speech”).
283
The Washington Legal Foundation litigates on behalf of corporate speech
rights. As to its interpretations of compelled commercial speech doctrine, see, for
example, Sarah Roller & Donnelly McDowell, Biotech Food Labeling Proposal Raises First
Amendment Concerns, Wash. Legal Found., Legal Opinion Letter 1 (Oct. 19, 2012),
279

http://www.wlf.org/upload/legalstudies/legalopinionletter/10-19-12RollerMcDowell_
LegalOpinionLetter.pdf; Sarah Roller & Donnelly McDowell, “FOP” Food Labeling: The

Energy Star® Model Raises First Amendment Concerns, Wash. Legal Foundation, Working
Paper 2, 9 (March 2012), http://www.wlf.org/upload/legalstudies/workingpaper/
RollerMcDowellWPFINAL.pdf; Charles M. English, Compelled Speech and The First
Amendment: Neutral Fact or Government Opinion?, Wash. Legal Found., Legal Analysis 1–
3 (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.wlf.org/upload/legalstudies/legalbackgrounder/1-1312English_LegalBackgrounder.pdf.
284
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 250 (2010)
(“[The] required disclosures are intended to combat the problem of inherently
misleading commercial advertisements—specifically, the promise of debt relief
without any reference to the possibility of filing for bankruptcy, which has inherent
costs.”).
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Zauderer’s rational basis review to be limited to instances where
285
governments act for the purpose of preventing consumer deception. A
greater number of courts interpret Zauderer’s rational basis review to
apply when governments require sellers to disclose information to
286
promote other purposes, including promoting public health.
Another point of disagreement among the lower courts is whether
the Zauderer Court’s description of the mandate before it as requiring
disclosure of only “purely factual and uncontroversial information” about
the terms of service offered is a prerequisite to apply Zauderer rational
basis review or merely an observation that supported the constitutionality
287
of the disclosure requirement at issue in that case. Although most
courts apply this requirement in some form, courts and judges do not
288
agree on what the standard means. Some courts have distinguished
285

Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d at 524 (noting “the flux and uncertainty of the
First Amendment doctrine of commercial speech, and the conflict in the circuits
regarding the reach of Zauderer”); Mass. Ass’n Private Career Schs. v. Healy, 159 F.
Supp. 3d 173, 197 (D. Mass. 2016) (“Zauderer reasonable-basis review is applicable . . .
if . . . the speech is potentially misleading.”).
286
Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Zauderer extends
beyond disclosures imposed to correct what would otherwise be a misleading
advertisement); Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 187 F. Supp. 3d
1123, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (rejecting the argument that “Zauderer is not applicable
because Zauderer governs only where the governmental interest is the prevention of
consumer deception” and finding that “Zauderer applies where the government asserts
an interest in, e.g., public health and safety”); CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City of
Berkeley, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1064–65 (N. D. Cal. 2015) (noting that several circuit
courts have rejected that same argument); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d
104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying Zauderer to uphold a state statute requiring
products to bear labels indicating that they contain mercury and must be disposed of
safely); Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 556 (6th Cir.
2012); N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 133 n.21 (2d Cir.
2009); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 310 n.8 (1st Cir. 2005); see
also Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech and
Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L.
REV. 555, 584 (2006) (“[C]ommercial speech is routinely and pervasively compelled
for reasons that have little to do with the prevention of deception.”); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart,
1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 125–27 (1996).
287
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d at 527 (finding the counterargument “persuasive,”
but seeing “no way to read [circuit precedent] except as holding that . . . Zauderer
requires the disclosure to be of purely factual and uncontroversial information about
the good or service being offered.’”); Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 559
n.8 (“Plaintiffs’ argument that Zauderer applies to only ‘purely factual and
noncontroversial’ disclosures is unpersuasive.”); Am. Beverage Ass’n, 187 F. Supp. 3d at
1135 (“Arguably, the Court’s reference to ‘factual and uncontroversial’ was simply a
description of what the state’s compelled disclosure was; it is not clear whether the
Court necessarily held that a compelled disclosure must be factual and
uncontroversial before rational review can be applied.”); CTIA, 139 F. Supp. 3d at
1068 (finding the “factual and uncontroversial” requirement does not apply when the
disclosure is clearly identified as mandated by the government).
288
Note, Repackaging Zauderer, 130 HARV. L. REV. 972, 984 (2017) (“No consistent
understanding of what either ‘factual’ or ‘controversial’ means for the purposes of
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289

“factual and uncontroversial” disclosures that qualify for Zauderer review
from compelled disclosures of judgments that they have characterized as
290
291
“subjective” or “ideological.” Judges on a District of Columbia Circuit
Court panel differed as to how to characterize a requirement that
companies confirm that their product is not associated with “conflict
minerals” mined in the Democratic Republic of Congo and, if they
cannot do so, report to the Securities and Exchange Commission and
292
state it on their website that they are not “DRC-conflict-free.” Courts
have also disagreed as to how to characterize graphic warning labels for
cigarette packages mandated by the FDA pursuant to the Tobacco
Control Act. The District of Columbia Circuit panel found the
“inflammatory images” and other features to be “unabashed attempts to
evoke emotion (and perhaps embarrassment)” which, while not “patently
false, . . . certainly do not impart purely factual, accurate, or
293
uncontroversial information to consumers.” A Sixth Circuit panel
found that the mandated text and graphics met the “factual and
uncontroversial” requirement because cigarette use is inherently
dangerous, and so tobacco disclosures may “appear in such a form, or
include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are
294
necessary to prevent its being deceptive.”
In sum, government-mandated information disclosure requirements
are commonplace, and generally subject to low level review. Marijuana
regulators should feel confident requiring sellers to disclose the qualities
of their product, proper dosage and use techniques, and adverse impacts
on particular consumers; for example, pregnant women or persons
driving cars or operating machinery, on the packaging or in advertising.
evaluating compelled commercial disclosures has emerged among commentators or
circuit courts that have attempted to flesh out this prong of Zauderer’s test.”).
289
Id. at 973–74.
290
Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 651, 652 (7th Cir. 2006)
(finding Zauderer’s deferential review did not apply because the “18” sticker required
for video games, which designated sexually explicit speech went beyond “purely
factual disclosures” and communicated “a subjective and highly controversial
message”).
291
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d at 530.
292
Compare id. (“The label ‘[not] conflict free’ is a metaphor that conveys moral
responsibility for the Congo war. It requires an issuer to tell consumers that its
products are ethically tainted, even if they only indirectly finance armed groups. An
issuer, including an issuer who condemns the atrocities of the Congo war in the
strongest terms, may disagree with that assessment of its moral responsibility. . . . By
compelling an issuer to confess blood on its hands, the statute interferes with that
exercise of the freedom of speech under the First Amendment.”), with id. at 532
(Srinivasan, J, dissenting) (“the descriptive phrase ‘not been found to be “DRC
conflict free’” communicates truthful, factual information about a product to
investors and consumers”).
293
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
294
Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 527 (6th Cir.
2012) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976)).
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Regulators should be aware, however, that as they stray into persuasive
messaging through warnings or imagery, judicial standards of review
become uncertain and the likelihood of a court challenge increases.
4. Government Speech and Targeted Taxes
A potent option in the public health regulatory scheme is speech
that is issued by the government, explaining the health dangers of
products and countering sellers’ persuasive advertising. The mandated
disclosure analysis, set out above, applies to speech identified by the
government but required to be broadcast from the vendors’ products or
295
property. Although it may be obvious to viewers that the government
crafted the communication, the fact that private sellers must publish it
invokes some level of Free Speech Clause scrutiny. By contrast, the First
Amendment rules that limit the government’s choices when it regulates
296
private speakers do not apply when the government speaks for itself. As
the Court explains, governments must speak to function, and often, to
fulfill their functions, must speak selectively, meaning they must choose
297
and advocate points of view. Government officials and entities in all
branches and at all levels may and do speak persuasively on controversial
298
299
issues. They need not prove that what they say is true, or even ensure
that messages generated by different departments of the same
300
government are consistent. All of this is good news for the government
public health mission, which depends for success upon broad authority
to present information selectively and persuasively to alter attitudes and
behavior about controversial issues.
Government-run counter-speech campaigns aimed at reducing youth
301
States and the federal
smoking have been highly successful.
295

Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 626 (1985).
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009) (“[G]overnment
speech is not restricted by the Free Speech Clause.”).
297
Id. at 468 (“[I]t is not easy to imagine how government could function if it
lacked this freedom [to select the views that it wants to express].”).
298
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877–78 (1992)
(governments may persuade women not to choose abortion); Sharon Jayson, Federally
Funded Ad Campaign Holds Up Value of Marriage, USA TODAY (Feb. 17, 2009),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/2009-02-17-marriagecampaign_N.htm.
299
David Leonhardt et al., Trump’s Lies vs. Obama’s, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/14/opinion/sunday/trump-liesobama-who-is-worse.html?_r=0 (finding that both presidents made “demonstrably and
substantially false statements”).
300
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 578 n.7 (2005) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (noting that different federal agencies advocate different positions on the
value of beef consumption).
301
Derigan Silver & Kelly Fenson-Hood, More Speech, Not Enforced Silence: Tobacco
Advertising Regulations, Counter-Marketing Campaigns and the Government’s Interest in
Protecting Children’s Health, 1 BERKELEY J. ENTM’T & SPORTS L. 1, 16 (2012) (comparing
counter-marketing campaigns and concluding that government-run campaigns
achieve public health objectives whereas industry-run campaigns do not); Pamela M.
296
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government have run such campaigns, and studies demonstrate their
302
effectiveness. Government entities often include counter-speech as one
element in a multi-pronged strategy to achieve public health objectives.
Communicating effectively, however, requires money. Government
agencies charged with pursuing public health and safety goals are
chronically underfunded, and must divide what resources they have
303
among many competing objectives. With alcohol and cigarettes, the
funds that public health agencies can acquire to spend on speech is only
a very small percentage of the funds devoted by the industries to
advertising. The same will undoubtedly be true for marijuana.
A variant on counter-speech that addresses the funding dilemma is
to tax the product or activity and use the proceeds for persuasive
government speech. The combination of the targeted tax and
government speech achieves a double effect benefiting public health,
reducing demand both through price sensitivity and by means of
government advocacy against the product or activity. California’s
Tobacco Control Program is the Cadillac example of an effective
targeted tax/government speech combination. With funds generated by
a wholesale cigarette package surtax, the state’s Department of Health
Services commissioned and promulgated a continuing stream of
advertisements designed both to educate the public about the health
risks of smoking, and to change consumer attitudes and behavior by
304
The “denormalization” campaign
“denormalizing” tobacco use.
aggressively attempted to attach a stigma not only to cigarettes, but to the
305
companies and individuals who market them. Numerous government
advertisements explicitly referenced and countered cigarette
manufacturers’ marketing, labeling it dangerous, deceptive and greed306
driven. That the government advertising campaign had a continuing
and regenerating source of funding independent of the state’s general
budget was crucial to its success.
A series of court challenges have resulted in decisions that validate
the constitutionality of this type of government speech funding
Ling et al., The Effect of Support for Action Against the Tobacco Industry on Smoking Among
Young Adults, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1449, 1449 (2007) (“One strategy that has been
found to be useful to decrease smoking among adolescents is ‘tobacco industry
denormalization.’ This includes media campaigns that educate the public about
deceptive tobacco industry practices to motivate action against smoking and to
increase the relevance of tobacco issues.”).
302
Ling et al., supra note 301, at 1449 (noting campaigns in California and
Florida and by the federal government).
303
See id.
304
Id. (“Denormalization” of tobacco use was pioneered by the California
Department of Health Services and “includes media campaigns that educate the
public about deceptive tobacco industry practices to motivate action against smoking
and to increase the relevance of tobacco issues.”).
305
See id. at 1451–52.
306
CAL. DEP’T OF HEALTH, A MODEL FOR CHANGE: THE CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE IN
TOBACCO CONTROL, SERVICES 3–5 (1998).
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mechanism. Tobacco companies challenged the California program,
arguing that the government speech doctrine did not shield the program
from constitutional scrutiny because the state “us[ed] taxes paid by a
specific industry to finance advertising that condemns that very
307
308
industry.” The district court rejected the argument, as did the two309
judge majority of the court of appeals. Shortly after the Ninth Circuit
panel filed its opinion, the Supreme Court rejected a similar forcedsubsidization of speech claim. In Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
310
Association, beef producers argued that a targeted tax to produce probeef advertising with which they disagreed violated their free speech
rights. The Court held that where the speech produced with the targeted
tax is government speech, meaning the government controls the content
of the message, “[c]itizens . . . have no First Amendment right not to
311
fund [it],” even when the tax is targeted at sellers of a particular
product and used to fund speech promulgating a particular disputed
viewpoint about that product. The one potentially “valid objection” that
the Court left open was to targeted taxes used to fund speech that is
presented in a way that those who funded it appear to endorse the

307

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Bonta, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1104 (E.D. Cal.

2003).
308

Id. (“[T]he Supreme Court has never suggested that the government speech
doctrine applies only to speech funded with general tax revenues. On the contrary, it
seems clear that speech by the government is government speech, however funded.
That is, given that the tax is lawfully imposed, the money collected becomes the
government’s to expend as it sees fit, so long as those expenditures fall within legal
limits.”).
309
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Shewry, 423 F.3d 906, 911 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The
tobacco companies concede that (1) the imposition of the tax itself is not
unconstitutional and (2) the message produced by the government’s advertisements
creates no First Amendment problem apart from its method of funding. Rather, they
argue for an independent First Amendment violation based on the close nexus
between the government advertising and the excise tax that funds it. We reject this
argument as unsupported by the Constitution and Supreme Court precedent, and as
so unlimited in principle as to threaten a wide range of legitimate government
activity.”); id. at 932–33 (Trott, J., dissenting) (“[R]eview under any of the available
standards reveals that the compelled assessments in this case constitute an
exceptional case of government intrusion on the right not to be compelled to finance
speech. Indeed, the Act is designed to force one particularly disfavored group to fund
speech directly undermining that group’s reputation. Such state action offends the
very essence of the First Amendment. . . . Moreover, the State can provide no limiting
principle, no logical reason why, if the government is free to tax and speak in this
manner against this group, it cannot do so against any other disfavored group or
individual. . . . Contrary to the Attorney General’s claim that the democratic process
will provide a check on the use of taxes to fund such messages, by removing the
burden of the cost of this program from every taxpayer except the ones targeted, this
tax becomes the ultimate cheap shot, one not fully subject to the considerations that
normally attend the decision to require the public at large to pay for something.”).
310
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 567 (2005).
311
Id. at 562.
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312

government message. In a decision denying rehearing, the court of
appeals again split. The two-judge majority read the Johanns decision to
“affirm[ its] reasoning,” and rejected the tobacco producers’ claim that
the advertisements were of a type that fit into the exception noted by the
Johanns Court, where viewers would attribute the government’s speech to
313
314
them. Despite the dissenting judge’s protests, this series of decisions
validates targeting taxes on sellers of hazardous products to pay for
clearly identified government speech aimed at reducing demand for
their lawful product.
5. Limit Tax Deductibility of Advertising Expenses
Marijuana business expenses are not deductible from federal income
315
taxes. This is true even though such businesses are, at least technically,
required to pay federal taxes, and the federal tax code treats drug
businesses differently than other illegal businesses. Drug dealers have not
challenged the different treatment in court, and for good reason. The
applicability of the First Amendment to state laws that impact marijuana
sellers’ speech about transactions that are legal under state law is
uncertain. It is clear, however, that the First Amendment does not
protect marijuana sellers, who promote transactions that are illegal
under federal law, from different treatment by the federal government,
316
even if it is based on the content of their speech.
Many states have the same disallowance of marijuana business
expenses in their tax codes. Although constitutional protection from the
federal or state constitution applies to marijuana advertising, to the
extent that a state makes transactions legal, the states could likely retain
the same blanket disallowance of marijuana business expenses consistent
with free speech guarantees. The Supreme Court has recognized that
317
governments have broad discretion in crafting tax rules and are “not
required to subsidize First Amendment rights through a tax exemption
318
319
or tax deduction.” In Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., the
Court upheld a federal tax deduction for lobbying expenses by veterans’
groups, which was not available to other groups. The Court later
312

Id. at 565 n.8.
Shewry, 423 F.3d at 908 (“A reasonable viewer could not believe that these antiindustry ads, expressly identified as ‘Sponsored by the California Department of
Health Services,’ were created, produced or approved by the [tobacco industry].”);
id. at 910 (Trott, J., dissenting) (“There is a world of difference between what was at
issue and at stake in Johanns and what is on our docket here.”).
314
Id. at 910 (Trott, J., dissenting) (the Constitution does not permit “coerced
speech [that] is deliberately destructive of those forced to pay for it”).
315
26 U.S.C. § 280E (2012).
316
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297–98 (2008).
317
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 451 (1999) (noting that “in the First
Amendment context the[re is a] strong presumption in favor of duly enacted
taxation schemes”).
318
Id. at 450.
319
461 U.S. 540, 550–51(1983).
313
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explained the “distinction [as] based on preferential treatment of certain
speakers” and not “a distinction based on the content or messages of
320
those groups’ speech.” So long as states maintain a blanket, preexisting
denial of tax deductions for business expenses, the different treatment
will likely pass constitutional scrutiny because its genesis is obviously and
probably the legislature’s dislike of drug dealers and an unwillingness to
use tax dollars to support their illegal activities, not with the message of
advertising specifically.
Likely, states may also impose a new, blanket deduction for
marijuana business expenses, or perhaps even carve out “core” business
expenses for allowable deductions while denying deduction for “frills,”
which includes advertising. In either of these instances, with the proper
record, regulators could demonstrate that their intent was to deny a
subsidy to the business, because of the product it sells and the health
dangers, rather than to penalize the company particularly. However,
targeting marijuana advertising specifically as ineligible for a business
expense deduction, when all other expenses are allowed, would likely
321
cross the line into unconstitutional action. While the government is not
required to subsidize speech, it cannot target speakers for disadvantages,
including denial of a subsidy, for the purpose of suppressing the
322
A law that denied tax deductibility only for
speaker’s message.
marijuana advertising, or even only for advertising of particular
disfavored products, would be difficult to explain as anything other than
aimed at the messages rather than more broadly aimed at product
323
availability.

320

Rosenberger v. Rector Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 832 (1995); see
also Leathers, 499 U.S. at 450 (Regan “stands for the proposition that a tax scheme that
discriminates among speakers does not implicate the First Amendment unless it
discriminates on the basis of ideas.”).
321
But see Shoshana Speiser & Kevin Outterson, Deductions for Drug Ads? The
Constitution Does Not Require Congress to Subsidize Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug
Advertisements, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 453, 461 (2012) (arguing that the federal
government could constitutionally ban direct-to-consumer advertising, which is
exclusively used by pharmaceutical companies).
322
Leathers, 499 U.S. at 453 (“[D]ifferential taxation of speakers, even members
of the press, does not implicate the First Amendment unless the tax is directed at, or
presents the danger of suppressing, particular ideas.”); id. at 452–53 (a tax exemption
may not appear as “a ‘deliberate and calculated device’ to penalize a certain
[speaker].”).
323
Id. at 453 (Taxing cable television providers while not taxing other media
entities does not violate the Constitution because “[t]he [government] has chosen
simply to exclude or exempt certain media from a generally applicable tax. Nothing
about that choice has ever suggested an interest in censoring the expressive activities
of [the entities subject to the tax].”).
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III. STRATEGIES FOR CREATING EFFECTIVE AND DEFENSIBLE
MARIJUANA ADVERTISING AND MARKETING RESTRICTIONS
Regulators must have a clear strategy to be able to regulate
comprehensively and effectively, while reducing the possibility of
expensive and time-consuming litigation. Regulators who are considering
regulations that restrict marijuana advertising should run through the
following checklist to guide their decisions and help them structure
regulations effectively.
(a) Identify clear and precise objectives. Reason from specific
harms to be avoided back to concrete and particular objectives.
Consider subdividing broad objectives. State each objective
specifically and separately. For example, proven health harms
to users under the age of 21 may lead to a goal of avoiding
underage use. Greater health harms, or more likely overuse by
high school students, may lead to a goal to prevent high school
use. Proven health harms from overuse by adults may lead to
the broad goal of preventing overuse. Alternatively, misuse by
unsophisticated adult users may lead to a more specific goal of
avoiding misuse by “marijuana tourists” or new users. Similarly,
evidence showing that combined use of marijuana and alcohol
causes adverse health and safety effects324 may lead to a goal of
preventing combined use. More specifically, evidence showing
that marijuana and alcohol is the most frequently detected
drug combination in car accidents325 may lead to the targeted
goal of preventing combining drugs and driving.
(b) For each objective, consider regulatory options separately,
moving from the least speech-restrictive means to advertising
restrictions as a last resort.
(c) Consider implementing regulations of the product, sales
locations, licensing, pricing practices that do not restrict
protected speech.
(d) Consider inserting more speech through carefully crafted
government health warning campaigns supported by general
tax dollars or taxes targeted at marijuana sellers.
(e) Consider denying tax deductibility of business expenses, which
include advertising; avoid targeted denials at the cannabis
industry limited to advertising.
(f) Consider compelling commercial disclosures rather than
restricting advertising.
(g) Consider implementing regulations of point-of-sale conduct
324

Am. Ass’n for Clinical Chem., Any Dose of Alcohol Combined with Cannabis
Significantly Increases Levels of THC in Blood, SCI. DAILY, 852 (May 27, 2015)
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2015/05/150527112728.htm.
325
Stanford Chihuri et al., Interaction of Marijuana and Alcohol on Fatal Motor
Vehicle Crash Risk: A Case-Control Study, INJURY EPIDEMIOLOGY (2017), https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28286930.
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that may be expressive, for the purpose of restricting consumer
access to the product rather than to the message.
(h) If implementing regulations that restrict seller messaging
because it is persuasive, document the decision-making process
to meet the requirements of “heightened” commercial speech
review. Specifically, collect evidence that shows that
(1) the adverse effect identified by the clear and precise
objective of the regulation exists;
(2) the persuasive messaging restricted by the regulation
causes the adverse effect;
(3) the entire scheme of regulations confirms the objective to
eliminate the adverse effect;
(4) the particular restrictions are obviously tailored to restrict
speech that causes the adverse effect without restricting
“extra” speech that does not obviously cause the adverse
effect; and
(5) less speech-restrictive alternatives are too expensive,
politically not feasible, or would be significantly less
effective.

CONCLUSION
Legalization of marijuana presents opportunities and poses dangers,
particularly to public health. The task of regulators, in jurisdictions
where use is legal, is to craft rules that preserve, and perhaps even
promote, legal and healthful access, while excising dangerous practices.
When these dangerous practices take the form of communications from
product sellers to consumers, federal and state constitutions limit the
extent to which regulators may use this means—restricting protected
speech—to achieve their legitimate and important purpose of protecting
public health. So, on the one hand, regulators must be cautious. On the
other hand, they must not be too timid to take lawful steps necessary to
protect the public from the physical and fiscal consequences of underage
use and adult overuse and abuse. This Article offers a step-by-step guide
to assist regulators in navigating the constitutional terrain so that they
can make efficient and effective decisions about how to regulate the new
marijuana trade to fulfill their missions to protect public health and
safety.

